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NORMATIVE CONTROVERSIES UNDERLYING
CoNTEmPoRARY DEBATES ABOUT CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM: A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY
AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
ROBERT G. VAUGHN*

INTRODUCTON

Federal judges survive as the only romantic figures in the three
branches of government. Executive officials appear entangled in administrative bureaucracies and rarely emerge other than as functionaries.
Service in Congress seems less a personal enterprise as the cost of elections, the structure of committees, the demands of constituents, the esoteric rules, and the proliferation of staff turn the legislator into a manager
and a fundraiser. Judges, however, control their courtrooms and personally resolve issues of national importance. They stand against popular
prejudice, redress wrongs, and thunder against mendacity and greed.
Even the criticism of judges condemns their idiosyncrasies and their
ability to implement personal visions of the law.
Given this perception, the links between courts and bureaucracy
may seem strange, even jarring. Yet, in this article, I assert that the discussion of the future of the federal courts requires an examination of
theories about executive bureaucracies. The romantic vision of federal
judges captures one, but increasingly not the most, salient aspect of the
federal judiciary. The recent literature regarding the judiciary chronicles
the decline of this romantic perception and reflects unease, if not concern, about the future. Indeed, the fear of bureaucratic justice lies beneath
much of the debate about civil justice reform. For example, participants
in the debate about civil justice reform have repeatedly written about
bureaucracy in examining the federal courts and their future.' Com* A. Allen King Scholar and Professor of Law, Washington College of Law of American
University. I thank Michael Troy and Jocelyn Mendoza for their assistance in researching this article. Also I thank my colleagues, John Bernard Corr, Charles Nihan, and Nancy Policoff for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Particularly, I thank my colleague Thomas Sargentich for his
time and for his assistance. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Alumni Development Fund
of the Washington College of Law.
1. Discussions of bureaucracy have occupied a significant amount of the literature addressing
civil justice reform and the future of the federal courts. Several books and articles use conceptions of
bureaucracy as a central point of discussion. See DAVID NACHMIAS & DAVID H. ROSENBLWOM,
BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT USA 141, 141 (1980) (asserting that "while the judicial system has
always been bureaucratic in terms of structure, it is now operating in an increasingly bureaucratic
fashion as well"); David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A StatisticalAnalysis of Federal
DistrictCourts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 66-67 (1981) (illustrating the
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transformation of judges into administrators and rejecting the current judicial reform movement's
emphasis on bureaucratic efficiency); Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
"Bureaucracy" of the FederalCourts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the Searchfor Appropriate
Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 878-90, 927-28 (1983) (discussing and rejecting the theory of
bureacratization of the federal court system but offering alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a
remedy to the growth in judges' case-loads); Owen I. Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary,
92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1442-43, 1462 (1983) [hereinafter Fiss, Bureaucratization](delineating, through
analysis of particular scholarship, the bureaucratization of the judiciary as an inevitable process for
which potential problems can be minimized); Wolf V. Heydebrand, The Context of Public Bureaucracies: An OrganizationalAnalysis of FederalDistrict Courts, I1 L. & Soc'y REv. 759, 759-60
(1977) (detailing the growing bureaucratization of courts and in turn rejecting that bureaucratization
as a strategy for dealing with court growth); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma ofthe FederalJudiciary,31 ALA. L. REV. 261,264-65 (1980) (warning that the growth in the
use of magistrates and administrative law judges is infecting the federal judiciary with a "carcinogen" bureaucracy); Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 777, 777-81 (1981) (warning that the increase in the number of federal judges, law clerks, and
staff attorneys, as well as the decrease in full court opinions may transform federal courts into bureaucracies); Gilbert S. Merritt, Owen Fiss on ParadiseLost: The JudicialBureaucracy in the AdministrativeState, 92 YALE LJ. 1469 (1983) (recognizing federal judges as administrators); Bernard
S. Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 MD. L. REv. 659, 667 (1983)
(arguing that inter- and intra-goverumental relations are fostering bureaucracy in the judiciary and
offering solutions including the restructuring of the functioning of legislative bodies and the courts,
and simplifying court procedures); William M.Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice
Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U. MicH. J.L REFORM 623, 624-25, 646 (1988) (discussing
scholarly criticism alleging bureaucratization of the United States Courts of Appeals and why such
criticism has resulted in little change in judicial behavior); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the
FederalCourts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 654
(1980) (detailing the increased workload of the federal courts and suggesting management techniques and methods to "halt the dilution of judicial responsibility"); Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, andLegal Method, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 248, 251 (1981) (arguing that "[bureaucratiztion
is reflected in the elaboration of the Court's institutional organization, particularly its hierarchical
aspect"); Patricia M. Wald, Bureaucracyand the Courts, 92 YALE LJ. 1478, 1478-79, 1485 (1983)
[hereinafter Wald, Bureaucracy& Courts)(agreeing with Owen Fiss's general approach, but parting
with Fiss on a specific solution); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed
Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?,42 MD. L. REv. 766, 766-69 (1983) [hereinafter
Wald, Black-Robed Bureaucracy] (refuting the idea that federal appeals courts are becoming a
bureaucracy but recognizing that some institutional limitations need to be implemented in order to
retain judges' abilities for personalized decision making).
Other articles use conceptions of bureaucracy as criteria for the examination of specific
aspects of the federal courts. See Thomas E. Baker, IntramuralReforms: How the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 913, 943-51 (1995) [hereinafter Baker,
Intramural Reforms] (describing the expansion in the number of federal judicial support personnel
and relating the concern that dependence on appellate staff has bureaucratized the judicial process);
Thomas E. Baker, ProposedIntramuralReforms: What the U.S. Courts ofAppeals Might Do to Help
Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1321, 1357-58 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Proposed Reforms]
(comparing the present bureaucracy of appellate judging with the role of an appellate judge 20 years
ago); Philip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982, 50
U. Ctl. L. REv. 628, 636-37 (1983) (commenting on the bureaucracy of the Supreme Court); John
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. Cit. L. REV. 823, 823 (1985) (arguing that "Continental civil procedure," such as is found in Germany, "avoids the most troublesome
aspects" of U.S. civil procedure by taking the judicial process out of partisan hands, and "assigning
judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts"); Otto R. Skopil, Jr., Long Range Planningin the
FederalJudiciary: Some Observations on a Work in Progress, 14 MISS. C. L REV. 199, 204-05
(1994) (emphasizing that the federal courts, in a structural administrative governance sense, am not a
hierarchical bureaucracy and as such "centralized plan formulation and implementation" in a corpo-
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monly, a particular aspect of the proposals regarding trial or appellate
practice is identified and then characterized as either engendering or reducing bureaucracy in the courts. In this exercise, the courts may be compared to the public bureaucracies of executive administrative agencies.!
This approach risks using language about bureaucracy as a rhetorical device expressing approval or disapproval of the practice at issue.
Analysis turns on definition. The selection and application of the definition usually controls the result. Therefore, commentators can see the
same practice as a confirmation of bureaucracy as well as its rejection.!

rate manner is difficult); Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and IllegitimateDecisionalInconsistency:
A Comment on Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error,59 S. CAL L. REV. 423, 440-41 (1986)
(noting how hierarchical control in the name of efficiency sometimes results in information not
being "processed" by the "checks of adversarial process"); J. Harvie Wilkinson 11l, The Drawbacks
of Growth in the FederalJudiciary,43 EMORY LJ. 1147, 1147 (1994) (arguing that "growth [in
caseload] is compromising the effectiveness of the federal function").
2. See, e.g., NACHMIAS & ROSENBLOOM, supra note I, at 170-71 (asserting that judges are
increasingly functioning as public bureaucrats by taking on administrative roles when their orders
involve reforms to public institutions); Clark, supra note 1, at 68-89 (noting that the administrative
trend in the judiciary may make it more closely resemble the executive branch of government);
Kurland & Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 636-37 (discussing the likelihood that, as with Cabinet
officers in the executive branch, judicial opinions are written by judicial staff rather than by judges
alone); Vining, supra note i, at 252-55 (arguing that if judicial opinions were to become the product
of clerks, rather than judges, such opinions would be treated with the same disregard lawyers have
for administrative opinions). But see, e.g., RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE
POLITICs OF FEDERAL COURTS 167-69 (1970) (finding that federal courts are not bureaucratic; they
are instead political); Edwards, supra note 1, at 882-85 (distinguishing the judiciary from public
service bureaucracies and noting that though judges may delegate responsibilities, few are likely to
delegate decision making to their staffs).
3. The inconsistency of analysis arising from varying definitions of bureaucracy exists in
much of the literature addressing the growing bureaucratization of the federal judiciary in specific
contexts such as judicial clerks, compare Rubin, supra note 1, at 652 (arguing that the expanded
duties of law clerks creates a risk of institutional judging), with Edwards, supra note 1, at 885-89
(asserting that growth of judicial support staffs will not lead to judges delegating decision-making
authority to those staffs); central appellate staff, compare Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at
627-29, 636-38 (noting that over-reliance on staff attorneys endangers the judicial function), with
Wald, Black-Robed Bureaucracy, supranote 1, at 778-80, and Wald, Bureaucracy& Courts, supra
note 1, at 1485 (noting the benefits to a judge of having a central appellate staff); the number of
judges, compare Wilkinson, supranote 1, at 1164, 1172 (asserting that an increase in the number of
judges leads to more bureaucracy, thus arguing for limits on the expansion of the federal judiciary),
with Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 625 (describing literature viewing the increase in judges
as an alternative to more administrative and bureaucratic approaches to justice); magistrate judges,
compare Higginbotham, supra note 1, at 266-67 (condemning the growth in the number of magistrate judges and other judicial officers as establishing a bureaucracy not subject to the protections
given to Article I judges), with Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on JudicialPower
in the Era ofManagerialJudging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 92-105 (1995) (proposing greater use
of magistrate judges in pretrial to return accountability to the trial process); the institutions of judicial administration (including the Judicial Conference, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Administrative Office of the United States), compare Clark, supra note i, at 76-77 (stating that judicial
institutions, such as the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Federal Judicial Center,
further the process of "[bJureaucratic coordination" in the operation of the federal courts), with
RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2, at 167-69 (arguing that the Judicial Conference and similar
institutions do not stifle judicial autonomy); and curtailing oral argument, compare McCree, supra
note 1, at 790-91 (emphasizing the risk of curtailing oral argument to the personalized judicial role),
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Indeed, activities of the court viewed as worthy of protection from bureaucracy may be seen by others as the court's incorporation into the
bureaucracy. Of course, the choice of a definition can offer powerful
insights that help to frame the discussion. For example, Owen Fiss's proposal that bureaucracy poses the danger of a lack of accountability and
responsibility identifies a central fear of bureaucracy at odds with the
perception of the judge as a personal decision maker.' The articulation of
that fear has influenced subsequent discussion: Even the most thorough
definitions, rigorously applied, however, can fail to clarify the discussion. For example, David Nachmias's and David Rosenbloom's application of Max Weber's definition of bureaucracy permits as much dispute
as it resolves.!
Commentators recognize that the discussion of procedural and
structural reforms implicates political and ideological considerations.
These considerations are perhaps easier to perceive on issues such as the
scope of federal jurisdiction" but they have been identified regarding
with Robert J. Martineau, The Value ofAppellate OralArgument: A Challenge to the Conventional
Wisdom, 72 IowA L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1986) (asserting that the court must employ oral argument
much less than it does now and that its construction must change if it is to be a useful tool at all).
4. Fiss, Bureaucratization,supra note 1, at 1443. Fiss expresses doubts about Max Weber's
definition of bureaucracy, which emphasizes rules governing conduct, and prefers the approach of
Hannah Arendt, which focuses on the impact on moral character of those within a bureaucracy
through the fragmentation of human experience and the loss of a sense of individual responsibility.
See id. at 1450-56.
5. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 880 Cagree(ing] with Fiss that bureaucracy in the
sense of 'Rule by Rules' is unlikely to overtake the federal judiciary"); Merritt, supra note 1,at
1469-72 & n.5 (reiterating Fiss's views but countering some of them, arguing that "Itheadvent of
the staff attorney, the summary affirmance, and oral dispositions from the bench seem justified, if
used within reasonable limits"); Wald, Bureaucracy& Courts, supra note 1 at 1479-83 (concurring
with Fiss that organizational reform of the judiciary is needed but rejecting his remedies as "too
much toward the quaintly anachronistic notion that judicial responsibility requires freeing judges
from worrying about how others act so that they can worry about doing everything themselves').
6. These authors base their analysis on Weber's description of bureaucracy and apply this
definition to the federal courts. NACHMAS & ROSENBLOOM, supranote 1, at 148-62. Their book is
notable for the rigor with which they apply Weber's definition and the range of aspects of the judiciary considered in this application. As noted above, different results might be reached by authors who
choose other definitions of bureaucracy. See supra note 3 (noting different definitions of bureaucracy in judicial institutions). In addition, different results could follow the application of Weber's
definition depending upon the aspects of the definition emphasized and the description of the circumstances to which it is applied.
7. Politics can be conceived, for example, both in terms of general values in conflict within
the political system and in terms of the advantages and disadvantages that jurisdictional rules impose
on different groups. As such, court commentators themselves conceive of politics in a number of
ways. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS INTHE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 4-6, 17-19 (1991) (exploring how representational and counter-majoritarian principles have influenced federal jurisdiction); RUSSELL R.
WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
22 (1989) (noting that in creating the federal court system, questions surrounding the organization
and structure of federal courts were not mere technical questions, but at a deeper level passionate
political conflicts); Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases,99 HARV. L.REV. 1808, 1817-18
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practice and procedure as well.! At heart, the discussion consists more of
values than of techniques. Therefore, this portion of the literature rejects
an approach to the debate that sees it as deciding how the federal courts
can be more efficient-an approach that identifies reform as a technical
matter divorced from normative considerations. This portion of the literature recognizes the normative content of reform proposals but often
seeks to connect such content with specific values, such as judicial independence or individual rights.9 These values are classically associated
with images of the federal courts.' However, these proposals fail to
identify a broader range of competing values.
Unfortunately, definitions of bureaucracy have also failed systematically to identify these normative considerations or to provide the basis
for organizing and analyzing the welter of proposals and accompanying
arguments. I believe, however, that the way one talks about bureaucracy
can contribute significantly to the discussion regarding the future of the
federal courts by identifying suppressed normative considerations, by
explaining inconsistencies in argumentation as clashes between competing visions of judicial legitimacy, and by demonstrating that civil justice
reform touches the deepest value conflicts in modem American public
law.
(1986) (emphasizing that rising caseloads reflect a growth in the availability of redress under law,
not an explosion of litigation); Arthur D. Hellman, Courting Disaster,39 STAN. L. REv. 297, 311
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985), and noting
the ideological foundations of judicial reform proposals); Mark Thshnet, GeneralPrinciples of the
Revision of FederalJurisdiction:A PoliticalAnalysis,22 CONN. L. REV. 621,637-40 (1990) (highlighting that the branches of government are affected by different interest groups and that conflicts
about jurisdiction represent views on the character of the courts and the role of government, explaining why these differences prevent a consensus regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction in the
political branches or in the courts, and noting that changes in federal jurisdiction are sometimes
motivated not by caseloads but by a desire to change the way in which cases are decided); Wald,
Black-Robed Bureaucracy,supra note 1,at 771 (noting that the influx of cases "reflects more legal
protections, benefits, and access for those groups that previously only encountered the law as a
weapon aimed against them").
8. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992) (arguing that the
procedural court reforms proposed by the Council on Competitiveness implement a blatantly political agenda); Matthew R. Kipp & Paul B. Lewis, Legislatively Directed JudicialActivism: Some
Reflections on the Meaning of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 305, 311-16
(1995) (noting Lockean views underlying traditional federal procedure); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
American Law Institute Study on Pathsto a "Better Way:" Litigation,Alternatives, andAccommodation, 1989 DUKE LJ. 824, 847-50 (discussing the various values and perspectives at issue in
procedural reform); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 628, 630 (indicating how "the perceived need to do
something about the outcomes of the cases the courts are handling" is a reflection of "the politics of
jurisdictional revision").
9. See, e.g., discussion and sources cited supra note 7 (noting the different influences and
implications of procedural and structural reform on the federal court jurisdiction).
10. See, e.g., THE DECLARATtON OF INDEPENDENCE pant. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He has made
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of
their salaries.'); THE FEDERAtIsT No. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(discussing life tenure of federal judges as a means of ensuring judicial independence to "guard the
[C]onstitution and the rights of individuals").
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I propose to demonstrate that an examination of a way in which legal scholars have analyzed the structure of arguments about bureaucratic
practices in executive administration can advance the debate about the
future of the federal courts. To be successful in this regard, a language
about bureaucracy" must permit an observer to identify the underlying
values contained in the discussion, to place disparate practices and proposals within that framework, and to recognize how arguments supporting a particular proposition may be inconsistent with one another, as well
as to predict the relationships between proposals and the values they
support. To do this, I use the work of two administrative law scholars,
Thomas Sargentich and Gerald Frug. Despite important differences between them, two of their articles provide comprehensive views of bureaucracy that go beyond argument over definition. Because of this
comprehensiveness, they offer a more descriptive and analytical language that I believe illuminates the discussion about the future of the
federal courts.
Thomas Sargentich's article, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate,2 focuses on broad theories

about the "legitimacy and character of administrative decision making."' 3
In so structuring the debate, Sargentich organizes proposals for reform of
the administrative process in an informative and analytically powerful
way. He identifies three ideals of the administrative process: the "Rule of
Law Ideal," the "Public Purposes Ideal," and the "Democratic Process
Ideal."" These ideals contain a core embodiment of how the administrative process should operate." Because these ideals are not fully implemented in the reality of administrative practice, each contains an altemative expression reflecting the limitations that reality places on implementation of the corresponding core embodiment."' Each alternative expression also reflects the theoretical weaknesses of its respective core
embodiment.' The core embodiment of the Rule of Law Ideal is formalism and its alternative expression is proceduralism. The core embodiment of the Public Purposes Ideal is instrumentalism and its alternative
expression is the market. The core embodiment of the Democratic Proc11. To avoid repetition of and grammatical difficulties with the phrase, "a way of talking
about bureaucracy," I occasionally use the phrase, "a language about bureaucracy," as an alternative.
In doing so I do not contend that the articles that I will examine create a "language," nor do I use the
term in a figurative sense that they create something analogous to a language.
12. Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385 [hereinafter Sargentich, AmericanAdministrative Process].
13. Id. at 394.
14. Id. at 392-93. Sargentich discusses the methodology of decision making in each of these
ideals in Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of Administrative Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 769, 771
(1991) [hereinafter Sargentich, Future ofAdministrative Law] (reviewing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990)).
15. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12, at 393.
16. See id. at 393-94.
17. See id. at 394-95.
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ess Ideal is participation and its alternative expression is oversight."
These ideals reflect general philosophical and ideological positions regarding the role of government and administration.
Gerald Frug's article, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law," presents four stories or models that "justify bureaucracy."" These
stories seek to reassure us that bureaucracies, with their potential for
domination, are under control. Regardless, Frug argues that each is incapable of providing a basis for the control of bureaucracy!' His discussion
unabashedly opposes bureaucratic organization, viewing it as inconsistent with democratic life.' These stories he calls the "Formalist Model,"
the "Expertise Model," the "Judicial Review Model," and the "Market/Pluralist Model.""' Although considerable correlation exists between
Sargentich's ideals and these models, there are important differences
between Sargentich and Frug?' For example, unlike Sargentich's reliance
on classical political theory, Frug relies on critical legal studies. He asserts that each model is doomed to failure because each relies on the impossible task of separating subjectivity and objectivity, the communal
and the shared, from the personal and the unique?5
In Part I, I use the analytical structures of these two articles to organize the arguments and proposals regarding civil justice reform and to
examine and critique their normative foundations. In so doing, I do not
rigidly follow either article, although the format of the presentation relies
on Sargentich's ideals. I do not contend that this undertaking incorporates the subtlety and nuance of either work, but I do believe that it captures the broad structures of analysis upon which I rely. With each of
these articles, I draw analogies between the corresponding comprehensive formulations of a language about bureaucracy and the literature of
judicial reform. These comprehensive formulations provide a systematic
way of thinking and talking and they influence perspective and perception. I contend that Part I shows that this way of talking about bureaucracy helps to identify the values underlying the discussion regarding civil
justice reform and permits organization of civil justice reform arguments
and proposals around those values.

18. See id. at 395.
19. Gerald E. Frog, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276
(1984) [hereinafter Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy].
20. id. at 1279; see id. at 1277-86 (using the areas of corporate and administrative law to

conduct his analysis).
21. See id. at 1277-78 (asserting that the stories are based on a single story which serves as a
"mechanism of deception").
22. See id. 1377-88 (using experiences in the Federal Circuit to examine arguments about
specialized courts and arguing that in the quest for freedom it is necessary to undermine the status
quo faith in bureaucratic organization as a protector of freedom).
23. Id. at 1282-84 (identifying the source and development of each story).
24. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
25. See Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supranote 19, at 1286-88.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

In Part II, I explore some of the implications of the application of
these discourses about bureaucracy to the evaluation of civil justice reform. I do this first by making some more specific observations about the
analytical approaches employed in the two articles. This exploration also
uses specific examples to indicate how this conception of bureaucracy
empowers a new assessment of arguments in the literature of civil justice
reform. For example, I show how the cluster of arguments supporting
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) contains arguments incompatible
with one another because they arise from differing visions of the judiciary. In this context, I also develop Sargentich's conclusion that some
arguments relating the alternative expression of one ideal with the core
embodiment of another can seem consistent until analyzed in light of the
underlying visions of each ideal. 6
I also describe how the application of a language about bureaucracy
can enrich concepts important to the discussion of judicial reform. For
example, I address judicial independence and individual rights, two such
concepts that often appear in discussions of the future of the federal
courts. The language of bureaucracy discloses the varied and conflicting
meanings of these deceptively inclusive terms. Because the meanings of
these terms are altered with each normative vision of the judiciary, they
can neither organize nor illuminate the tensions between these visions
that underlie specific proposals.
The way in which Sargentich and Frug each talk about bureaucracy
also suggests an analytical methodology. For example, their discussions
render less useful dichotomous categories that encourage the balancing
of values. Because the debate regarding civil justice reform rests on conflicting visions of the judiciary, balancing cannot accommodate these
incommensurable normative positions. Sargentich and Frug approach
their tasks from different intellectual perspectives. These differences
emphasize the similarity of many of their insights and they offer some
clues to fruitful ways of evaluating issues of civil justice reform.
Despite the widespread use of language about bureaucracy in the
literature of judicial reform, it may still seem odd to rely on views of
executive administration in examining the future of the federal courts.
After all, unlike administrative agencies, courts form a separate and independent branch of government, and an extensive body of constitutional
law and practice defines judicial power. Unlike administrative agencies,
courts are reactive. They generally lack substantive rulemaking power
and act only through adjudication. The setting and tenor of judicial and
administrative adjudication differ considerably. The constitutional status
of judges, the formality of the trial, the norms and traditions of trial, and
appellate practice distinguish judicial from administrative adjudication.

26.

See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12, at 439-40.
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Like agencies, however, the courts are lawmaking institutions that
must deal with burgeoning caseloads as they decide issues of national
significance. Courts face the challenges confronting executive administrative agencies: addressing increasing workloads, and issues of competence, rewards, and accountability. Perhaps most importantly, like administrative officials, federal judges and judicial officers are not elected.
Like administrative officials, these judges and judicial officers wield the
power and authority of government. With executive bureaucracies, each
of Sargentich's ideals of administrative law answers the central question,
"On what general normative principles may the use of often substantial
public power by unelected agency officials in our political system be
justified and, at least for the system as a whole, legitimated?"' According to Frug, the purpose of the stories of control is intended to ally our
m ' In her rereading of the traditional
fear of this same bureaucratic power.
story of the development of the federal courts in light of new versions of
the story, Judith Resnik states a like theme: "The terrorizing fear of too
much power."' The ways in which Sargentich and Frug talk about bureaucracy address this dilemma central to both administrative agencies
and to the courts."' Debates about the legitimacy of unelected administrative officials are relevant, with proper modifications, to the courts which
share this fundamental dilemma. Finally, to be useful, not every premise
of these conceptions of executive administration need apply to the courts.
However, the major aspects of them do illuminate normative conflicts
underlying debates about civil justice reform.
I. A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY
In this Part, I demonstrate how comprehensive examination of executive administration structures the discussion of the future of the federal courts. First, I set out in the most general way the types of criticisms
and reforms that populate this discussion. The presentation is general and
cursory because the character of the issues raised is explored in detail
27. Id. at 393.
28. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supra note 19, at 1284-85 (discussing the assurances
that the models seek to provide in order to counter perennial concerns that bureaucratic organizations
can dominate those outside of the organization and destroy the freedom of self-expression of those
within the organization).
29. Judith Resnik, Rereading "The FederalCourts:" Revising the Domain of FederalCourts
Jurisprudenceat the End ofthe Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L.REv. 1021, 1035 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Rereading the FederalCourts] (discussing the traditional story of the federal courts and
its limited ability to completely address the question of too much power in any one of the three
branches); see WHEEmE & HARRISON, supra note 7, at 2-4 (describing the historical concern that
courts can be tyrannical and noting that several provisions concerning judicial procedure were included in the Bill of Rights to address the problem).
30. Like the heads of administrative agencies and departments, federal trial and appellate
judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl.
art. I, § 1.Although the
2. Unlike these administrative heads, judges enjoy tenure for life. See id.
staffs are smaller in size, like administrative heads, judges supervise and rely on the efforts of a
number of personnel who are not subject to confirmation. See Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra
note 1,at 943-51.
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later in this Part. My intention is to give the reader some general background before beginning a more detailed examination. Next, using Sargentich's ideals of administrative law as the format, I examine Sargentich's and Frug's discussions of bureaucracy. Their views create a way of
talking about bureaucracy that I apply to civil justice reform, both to
organize the debate and to examine and critique its normative foundations. This application is aided by the large body of literature addressing
civil justice reform and its corresponding implications for the future of
the federal courts.
A. The Federal Courts in Transition
The character and number of issues regarding federal procedure and
the federal courts show that we are in the midst of a comprehensive reexamination of the role and legitimacy of the federal courts. Nearly every
major aspect of the judicial process and procedure is now a topic for discussion. For purposes of presentation rather than analysis, I introduce
these issues as ones related to the growing caseload of the federal courts,
to the appellate courts, to the pretrial process, to access to the courts, to
jury reform, to alternative dispute resolution, to judicial selection and
discipline, and to the relationships between the President, Congress, and
judiciary. Some sense of the scope of the discussion about the future of
the federal courts provides a basis for applying language about bureaucracy.
The growing caseloads of trial and appellate courts have in turn
generated a number of proposals, each of which raises a variety of issues
regarding the practicality and wisdom of the specific proposals!' These
proposals also involve a discussion of the future of the federal judiciary.
In a series of articles, Thomas Baker describes and evaluates proposals
that respond to this caseload in the appellate courts." He divides the re-

31. See Baker, Intramural Reforms, supra note 1, at 940; see also supra note I and accompanying teXt.
32. See Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 28 GA. L REV. 863, 863-65 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Past Extramural Refirms] (discussing the historical methods Congress has used to assist the federal courts faced with increasing
caseloads); Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28
GA. L REV. 913, 913-14 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Imagining Futures] (discussing the structual
proposals to reform the intermediate appellate courts); Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 1,at
913-14 (examining the various "procedural shortcuts" historically employed by the United States
Courts of Appeals); Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries--Why the Proposalto
Divide the United States Court of Appealsfor the Ninth CircuitIs Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ.
ST. LJ.917, 919 (1990) (discussing the then pending, but not adopted, proposal to divide the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit into two circuits); Baker, Proposed Reforms, supra
note 1, at 1321-32 (examining proposed "procedural shortcuts" currently in limited use in the United
States Courts of Appeals); Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Futureof JudicialFederalism: "Neither
Out FarNor In Deep," 45 CAsE W. RES. L REv. 705, 707-15 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Futureof
JudicialFederalism] (discussing the possible future of state and federal courts and the future opportunities for cooperation and judicial federalism).
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sponses into the intramural, steps that courts can take to more efficiently

dispose of cases, 3 and the extramural, steps that require changes from

outside the judiciary.' Included in the intramural are case management
and case tracking,"" increased use of settlement and other alternative
techniques of case resolution, ' more efficient use of support personnel,"

limitations on oral argument and on briefs, ' different procedures for different types of appeals, and resolution of appeals without a published

opinion.' Extramural responses include increases in the number of federal judges and other judicial personnel,' reducing or altering federal
33. See Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 1, at 913; Baker, Proposed Reforms, supra
note 1,at 1321-22.
34. See Baker, Past Extramural Reforms, supra note 32, at 864 (noting the requirement of
congressional action for this type of refor).
35. See Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 1, at 940-43 (discussing the variety of management plans which include tracking and monitoring of cases); see also Baker, ProposedReforms,
supra note 1, at 1330-31 (identifying the "hallmark" of case management to be the monitoring of
appeals through each stage and the increased importance of the screening process). These plans and
proposals have elicited comment. See, e.g., Hon. Stephen Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series:
"AdministeringJustice in the FirstCircuit," 24 SUnFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 42-44 (1990) (discussing
the current system of tracking appeals in the First Circuit and the limited possibilities for increased
efficiency within such a system).
36. See Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 1,at 941-42 (discussing the primary goal of
some case management plans to be settlement and the difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of
such programs).
37. Cf.id. at 943-51 (discussing the increased importance of both administrative and decisional personnel in response to an oppressive caseload).
38. See id.at 915-25 (discussing the reduced availability of oral argument and the increased
importance of written briefs); Baker, ProposedReorms, supra note 1, at 1337 (discussing the "reevaluation of the deemphasis of oral argument"). Other comments on the subject have been made.
See, e.g., McCree, supranote 1,at 790 (questioning the value of the efficiency gained by reducing
the number of appeals decided without oral argument); see also Martineau, supra note 3, at 33
(reviewing the history and various positions with regard to oral argument and concluding that unless
changes are made to the current oral argument process it "will continue to be little more than a waste
of time").
39. See Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 1,at 940-43 (discussing experimentation in
response to increasing caseloads); cf.Baker, Proposed Reforms, supra note 1, at 1330 (noting that
"differentiated case management has been the most common response" to the growth of appellate
dockets). The case management reforms have also been addressed by others. See, e.g., Breyer, supra
note 35, at 47 (discussing the identification of related cases for assignment and increasing settlement
and screening techniques); John B. Oaldey, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovationsfor the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REv. 859,859-62 (discussing in
great detail the adoption and continued use of appeal "screening" to manage workload).
40. See Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 1,at 930-39 (discussing issues of quality and
efficiency that are involved in deciding whether a decision should be published); Baker, Proposed
Reforms, supra note 1, at 1329-30 (discussing the possibilities of using a preliminary opinion, subjoct to review by the parties before a final opinion is published, as more efficient than the current
practice). These reforms have been discussed in detail by other authors. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 FLA. L.REv. 205, 218-23 (1985) (discussing the use of abbreviated unpublished decisions, advocating an'explanation of every decision made by a court of appeals
and favoring citation to unpublished decisions where appropriate); cf William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publicationin the United States CourtsofAppeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. Cmii. L. REV. 573, 573-74 (1981) (evaluating the publication plans of the
then II courts of appeals and proposing a model publication plan).
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jurisdiction, ' limiting appeals,' and restructuring the trial and appellate
courts." This listing only suggests the variety of responses under these
general rubrics and the complexity of the arguments that can be marshaled for and against them.
Connected to, but also separate from, the issues raised by these responses are issues related to reduced access to the courts. These areas are
related because several proposals for reducing the caseload burdens on
the courts would limit access to the courts; however, proposals in this
area reflect a different agenda.45 For example, these suggestions include
the imposition of user fees; ' settlement rules that would shift costs if
parties refusing settlement offers did not receive more favorable results
at trial; fee shifting provisions, such as variations of the English, loser
pays rules;' and penalties for frivolous litigation and appeals. '
Proposals from a variety of perspectives address the pretrial process.
Prominent among these are reform of the discovery process, use of alternative dispute resolution, and increased judicial involvement in encouraging settlement. ' Discussion of the pretrial process includes broader
issues, such as the implications of managerial judging' and alterations of
the adversary process.

41. See Baker, Past Rxtramural Reforms, supra note 32, at 877-88 (arguing that caseload
demands should be addressed by increasing the number of appellate judges only as a "last resort").
42. See id. at 865-71.
43. See Baker, ImaginingFutures,supranote 32, at 919-23.
44. See id. at 924-69 (discussing restructuring of courts through redrawing circuit boundaries,
establishing additional tiers of appellate courts, creating specialized national subject matter courts,
creating a centrally organized court of appeals, and drawing jumbo circuits); Baker, PastExtramural
Reforms, supra note 32, at 870-911 (discussing methods of court restructuring including increasing
the use of ADR, dividing courts of appeals, establishing specialized courts of appeals, and improving
the quality of federal legislation); see also J. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded
Circuits-A Plugfor a UnifiedCourt ofippeals,39 ST. LOUIS U. L. REv. 455, 457 (1995).
45. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 8, at 245 (discussing the Council on Competitiveness's
proposal to limit access to federal trial courts); cf.Baker, Imagining Futures, supra note 32, at 919
(creating discretionary appellate jurisdiction); Breyer, supra note 35, at 34-37 (discussing the 1990
Federal Courts Study Committee report that suggested limiting the right to appeal).
46. See Alschuler,supra note 7, at 1812 n.lI (discussing user fees as a method to manage the
caseload); c. Rowe, supranote 8, at 896-98 (discussing a more limited use of user fees).
47. Breyer, supra note 35, at 45-47 (arguing that strong smaller claims would benefit from
loser pay rules and discussing the advantages of tailoring fee shifting provisions).
48. Cf.Hensler, supra note 8, at 247-48 (discussing incentives for encouraging meritorious
litigation); Rowe, supra note 8, at 871 (discussing the incentives to reduce litigation, particularly
regarding costs and attorney fees).
49. See John Maull, ADR in the FederalCourts: Would Uniformity Be Better?, 34 DUQ. L.
REV. 245, 247-52 (1996) (discussing experimentation with ADR by local district courts); Rowe,
supra note 8, at 898-902 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative dispute resolution). See generally Hensler, supra note 8 (canvassing proposals regarding discovery abuse, case
management, and ADR).
50. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 252-74 and accompanying texL
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Reform of the civil jury also appears in a variety of contexts. Some
proposals seek to improve the decision-making ability of the jury;" other
proposals seek to alter the role of the jury by greater use of court appointed experts, expert panels, and expert courts." Attention has also
focused on the use of peremptory challenges in the selection of juries. '
Finally, relationships between the judiciary and other branches of
government appear in the literature.' Most of the discussion has addressed the role of Congress in procedural rulemaking and the implications of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.' Also of interest have been

52. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Historicaland ConstitutionalContexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 474-92 (1996) (arguing that simplifying jury instructions, increasing
judge-jury interactions, allowing judicial summary of and commentary on the evidence, eliminating
many complex evidentiary rules, and reducing the role of the directed verdict and of the judgment
not withstanding the verdict would be constitutional and consistent with historical practices in the
United States and in England; and returning the jury to a more activist role); Development in the
Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1411-21, 1459, 1503-13 (1997) [hereinafter The
Civil Jury] (presenting and commenting on various proposals for strengthening the jury system).
53. See Smith, supra note 52, at 458-70 (asserting that juries could be selected based on level
of education and previous trial experience and that specialized or expert juries could be used); The
Civil Jury,supra note 52, at 1459, 1491-92 (noting proposals for specialized juries and summarizing
criticisms of the jury system in complex cases). But see, e.g., Hellman, supra note 7, at 308-10
(discussing Posner's arguments against specialized courts). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The FederalCircuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1989) (using
experiences in the Federal Circuit to examine arguments about specialized courts); A. Leo Levin &
Michael E. Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships,44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (1995) (discussing the use of
expert surrogates for Article I judges).
54. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHL L. REV. 809, 809-12 (1997) (arguing that the peremptory challenge is
"meaningless" and "undemocratic" and thus is inconsistent with the current representational finctions of the jury); The Civil Jury, supra note 52, at 1460-63 (summarizing the debate about the
peremptory challenge); cf.Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment
As a ProhibitionAgainst the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. i, 2-9
(1990) (discussing the inherent unconstitutionality of an all-white jury in race-sensitive cases).
55. See, e.g., RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL
COURT GOVERNANCE: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD-AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD N0T--CREATE A
FULL-TIME EXECuTiVE JUDGE, ABOLISH THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT
JUDGES FROM DISTRICT COURT GOVERNANCE (1994) (discussing the current governance structures
and procedures of the federal courts and outlining proposed reforms and arguments favoring the
reforms that Congress may choose to adopt); Baker, Futureof JudicialFederalism,supranote 32, at
807 (discussing the relationship of the judiciary and the other branches, noting specifically with
respect to judicial and congressional relations that, "I must confess that I am not hopeful [for improved relations]'); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators:Enhancing the Relationship, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1541-42, 1550-53 (1995) (discussing examples of positive, contributory
exchanges between the judiciary and Congress from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s); see also Louis
Fisher, JudicialIndependence and the Line-Item Veto, JUDGES' J., Winter 1997, at 19, 53 (arguing
that the line-item veto may be constitutionally infirm because of its threat to judicial independence).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994); see, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin
ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN.L REV. 375, 382 (1992) (hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]
(discussing the many ways in which the Act infringes on judicial rulemaking, in fact producing an
environment which "authorizes unconstitutional mlemaking'); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separationof Powers,77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 128388 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Separation ofPowers] (arguing that the Act violates the separation
of powers doctrine); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, MeasuredProgress:The Evolution and
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changes in impeachment procedures" and the implications of the lineitem veto."
The literature suggests a lack of consensus regarding fundamental
issues of both procedure and structure." The literature evidences a federal judiciary in transition, a judiciary whose future may differ significandy from its past. Conceptions of bureaucracy provide one way of
organizing and critiquing the issues entailed in this discussion of the federal courts.
B. The Rule of Law Ideal
According to Sargentich, the Rule of Law Ideal rests on state contract theories that require the consent of the governed.' This vision seeks
to ensure that individuals are permitted to make their own choices free
from the interference of the state.' Public law divides the realm of government from that of private action.' Because of reliance on this distincAdministrationof the FederalMagistrateJudges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1520-23 (1995)
(suggesting how the Act has led to greater use of magistrates); see, e.g., Maull, supra note 49, at
245-47 (discussing the variations of alternative dispute resolution programs spawned by the Civil
Justice Reform Act's call for implementation of ADR in general).
57. See John P. Sah, Secret Disciplinein the FederalCourts--DemocraticValues and Judiciary Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE DAME L REV. 193, 221-50 (1994) (discussing weaknesses in
statutory disciplinary procedures); Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and DisabilityAct of 1980, 94 YALE LJ. 1117, 1125-33
(1985) (discussing the relationship between the Act and the impeachment power); Herman Schwartz,
The War Against JudicialIndependence, LA. TIMES, May 11, 1997, at M2 (noting threats of impeachment against federal judges for the content of their opinions). See generally RUSSELL R.
WHEELER & A. LEO LEVIN, FED. JUDICIAL CTM., JUDICIAL DISCPluNE AND REMOVAL IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979) (describing methods of judicial discipline and removal); Victor Williams,
Third Branch Independence and Integrity Threatened by PoliticalBranch Irresponsibility:Reviewing the Report of the National Commission on JudicialDiscipline and Removal, 5 SETON HALL
CONST. LJ. 851,870 (1995) (expressing concern about Senate impeachment procedures).
58. See generally Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line-Item Veto Act, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 331-32 (1998) (calling on the judiciary to strike down the Line-Item Veto
Act). This article does not specifically address the implications of the recent Supreme Court decision
which struck down the line-item veto as a violation of the presentment Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
7, cl. 2; see Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. C. 2091, 2095 (1998). Some of the concerns expressed by Senator Byrd and other opponents of the line-item veto have been alleviated by the
Court's decision in Clinton.However, as the Court struck down only the specific method utilized in
the implementation of the line-item veto before them, the critique is still relevant to future constructions of the line-item veto that will undoubtedly be deployed. See Clinton, 118 S. CL at 2108.
59. See Charles W. Nihan, A Study in Contrasts: The Ability of the FederalJudiciary to
Change Its Adjudicative and AdtninistrativeStructures, 44 AM. U. L REV. 1693, 1695 (1995) (concluding that the "judiciary is unlikely to reach a consensus on either judgeship limitations or jurisdictional changes, which many believe are necessary to cope with the judicial workload projected for
the next twenty-five years"); Tushnet, supranote 7, at 628-30 (suggesting that the different interest
groups affecting Congress and the courts ar likely to make consensus difficult both within and
among the branches).
60. See supra notes 31-59 and accompanying text.
61. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supranote 12, at 397-98.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 398.
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tion between public and private spheres, the core embodiment of the
Rule of Law Ideal is formalism-the idea that all exercises of public
power must be guided by legal rules." Although the conception of these
legal rules may vary, formalism rests its faith on these rules to separate
legal from political decision making."
Frug likewise describes the formalist model of bureaucratic control
as attempting to place all judgments regarding values, ends, and desires
outside of the bureaucracy.' The bureaucracy then objectively carries out
the subjective choices made by others." The bureaucracy applies rules
derived from outside itself, and these rules are such that their application
mechanically determines the outcome in specific instances." To Frug,
this line between the objective and subjective cannot be drawn.' His critique of the nondelegation doctrine leads him to conclude that no principled way exists to determine how much discretion regarding subjective
choices may be given by the legislature to administrative agencies.
For Sargentich, discretion exercised by administrative agencies also
limits formalism.!7' Like Frug, he believes that the nondelegation doctrine
seems unlikely to restrict this discretion in any important way.' Sargentich articulates a number of reasons for the existence of such discretion
including the "indeterminate and sweeping... scope"' of much legislation. Many practical and political considerations act to assure this indeterminacy.' Of particular interest is his conclusion that "statutory norms
designed to criticize existing institutions-for instance, antidiscrimina-

64. See id. at 398-99. The concept of legal norms can "include principles in Ronald
Dworkin's sense or rules in H.LA. Hart's sense." Id.at 398. The crucial element is that they are
"relatively autonomous from the sphere of frankly political decisions." Id. at 398-99.
65. See id. at 399.
66. See Frug, Ideology ofBureawracy,supranote 19, at 1298-99.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Cf. id. at 1300-03. Under this framework, some subjectivity must be introduced into the
bureaucracy because administrative agencies have always exercised at least some discretion. See id.
at 1301. In fact, such discretion "has always seemed indispensable." Id. The task of deciding what
discretion is permissible requires the separation of the objective and the subjective. See id. at 1301-03.
70. See id. at 1300-05. The nondelegation doctrine is the attempt "to distinguish the kind of
discretion agencies can exercise from the kind that must be exercised only by the legislature." id. at
1301. The failure of the doctrine to do so in any meaningful way illustrates the melding of the subjective and the objective. See id.
at 1304-05.
71. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12, at 402-03 (discussing
formalist limitations on the Rule of Law Ideal).
72. See id. at 400-02.
73. Id. at 402.
74. See id. at 403. These considerations include: lack of time, staff, and resources to develop
more precise agency limitations; the independent value of agency discretion through "expefimentation, flexibility and change without recourse to statutory amendment"; and the political expediency
of general language permitting compromise and focusing controversy on the administrative agency
rather than Congress. Id. Sargentich puts it frankly when he notes that by scripting vague and indeterminate legislation, Congress creates the framework in which the focus of controversy shines on
the administrative agency rather than on Congress. See id at 403-04.
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tion norms... -may require.. general and open-ended principles."75
This observation is of particular interest because a substantial number of
federal statutes applied by the courts are of this character!'
Because of the limitations on formalism, the Rule of Law Ideal
turns to proceduralism. ' Proceduralism protects the individual from
abuse of governmental power by requiring that government officials
follow certain procedures before acting.' Proceduralism, however, does
not ultimately restrict substantive discretion because it permits officials
to act on the basis of vague, unarticulated powers that permit a number of
substantive choices." The principal methodology of the Rule of Law
Ideal is legal reasoning-a methodology that manifests the importance of
restrictions on the exercise of power by the application of legal rules. 0
Likewise, Frug notes that some commentators argue that courts could
validly avoid the difficulties of substantive review by turning to procedure."' In his discussion of a judicial review model, Frug argues that attention to bureaucratic procedure, rather than substantive decisions, fails
to escape the contradictions that plague substantive review.'
1. Formalism
The applicability of this vision of the administrative process to
courts is suggested by Sargentich. According to him, the line between
legal reasoning and political judgment seems easier to draw with the
courts than with administrative agencies."2 He recognizes, however, that
in administrative law, the Rule of Law Ideal requires that courts reviewing administrative agencies follow the dictates of the legislature.'" The
inconsistency in the delegation doctrine is that courts are to be "restricted
decisionmakers"' applying the norms set out in the legislation; yet the
nondelegation doctrine may well require them to strike down the legisla-

75. Id. at 404. Statutes that seek to change existing institutions and practices require broad
principles because, "[ilf the critical norms were highly specific and thus strictly confined in their
reference or implications, their force as catalysts of social change inevitably would be blunted." Id.
76. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Sargentich recognizes that formalism can
deal with a few open-ended norms but not a statutory scheme where the majority of norms are of this
character. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12, at 402-04. Clearly, the
administrative process contains many of these open-ended norms. Arguably, the tasks of the federal
courts now require them to confront a substantial number of similarly open-ended norms.
77. See Sargentich, AmericanAdministrative Process,supranote 12, at 404-05.
78. See id. at 405.
79. See id. at 406-07.
80. See Sargentich, FutureofAdministrative Law, supranote 14, at 773-74.
81. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supra note 19, at 1343-44.
82. See id. at 1344. "This retreat to procedure ... adopts the same mixed formalist-expertise
structure that rendered substantive judicial rview incoherent." Id.
83. See Sargentich, AmericanAdministrative Process,supranote 12, at 399.
84. See id. at 400-01.
85. Id.
at 401.
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tion that contains the norms they are to apply." As Sargentich notes, this
"constitutionally-based nullification of legislative enactments in the administrative context presents the same conundra for courts that are raised
so often in discussions of judicial review."'
In his discussion of the judicial review model, Frug recognizes the
application of his analysis to the courts.U In conducting judicial review,
the courts can adopt either a formalist or expertise model of its role, emphasizing either the breadth of or the limits on judicial discretion.' The
courts can also combine the two models.' Skillfully used, this mixing of
models in defining the judicial role permits the courts to choose views of
its role that either doubly restrain or doubly authorize judicial intervention.9 ' Likewise, the courts can use formalist or expertise models of the
bureaucracy, emphasizing bureaucratic discretion or the limits placed

upon it.' The combination of these perceptions of the role of the courts
and of the bureaucracy generates sets of inconsistent arguments counseling for and against judicial intervention." Frug's description of the
formalist and expertise models of the role of the courts in control of bureaucracy fits nicely with the literature of civil justice reform discussed
in this Part of the article.
Some judicial systems still rely upon the language of formalism to
define and to defend the judicial role.' Civil law systems, particularly in
Latin America, reflect the dominance of the civil coder Law consists of
a set of norms that can be mechanically applied; this mechanical application supporting a perception of a limited role for the judge?' This lan-

guage of formalism remains attractive because the notions of democratic
legitimacy upon which the Rule of Law Ideal rests makes the decisions
of unelected judges vulnerable.

86. See id. at 401-02.
87. Id. at 401 (footnote omitted).
88. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1334-38.
89. See id.at 1337-38.
90. Cf. id. at 1340 (noting that "Justice Frankfurter... defined and circumscribed the court's
role by understanding it in joint formalist-expertise terms. He envisioned the courts as organizations
that could successfully combine the features of apparently antithetical model [sic] of bureaucratic
legitimacy").
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1340-42.
93. See id. at 1342-43.
94. See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, Proposalsfor JudicialReform in Chile, 16 FORDHAM IN'L
LJ. 577, 579-90 (19921993) [hereinafter Vaughn, JudicialReform) (describing the Chilean judiciary's history of emphasizing formal norms and its mechanical application).
95. See, e.g., id. at 581. See generallyTom Farer, ConsolidatingDemocracy in Latin America:
Law, Legal Institutions and ConstitutionalStructure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1295, 1310-23
(1995) (discussing the difference in conception of judicial function prevailing in common law countries as opposed to civil law countries).
96. See Farer, supra note 96, at 1312-13 (discussing the creation of bureaucratic career patterns that make judges less likely to strike down government action than those judges who do not see
themselves as bureaucrats).
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The legal realists in the United States critiqued formalism as a de-

fense of the exercise of public power by unelected officials." To the realists, legal norms established in precedent, in legislation, or in the Constitution were less important in determining outcomes than an examination of the behavior of the judges themselves." The norms limiting courts
were interpreted and applied by the courts, who had rather broad discretion to establish the content and application of these legal norms.
Constitutional interpretation repeatedly demonstrates that the courts
enjoy relatively broad policy-making powers. Although this power can
be justified on several grounds related to the character of judicial power,
the separation of powers, and the protection of individual rights, these
justifications less easily apply .to common law decisions or to statutesthe interpretation of which now forms the bulk of activity of the federal
courts." After the realists, precedent seems a malleable concept that imposes limits only on the margins. As do administrative agencies,
courts
®
confront statutes of "indeterminate and sweeping ... scope.""'
In these circumstances the options for reformers are few. One could
attempt to redefine judicial power around more formal limits, an option
embraced by many conservatives. Attacks on the antimajoritarian character of the courts have been combined with attempts to restrict constitutional interpretation by relying upon "original intent,"' to develop rules
of statutory construction that deny judges the use of legislative history,
thereby forcing courts to apply only the words of the statute" and to ad97. The formalist perspective may more properly capture the popular view of the courts. For
example, even that astute observer and prolific author, Isaac Asimov, saw a future where decisions
would be made by computers analyzing precedent, a development that he believed would guarantee
fair results and eliminate the advantages conferred on litigants with greater resources. Isaac Asimov,
The Next 70 Years for Law and Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 56, 58 (1985).
98. Cf. G. EDWARD WHIrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 251-91 (expanded ed. 1988) (discussing the impact of legal realism and process
jurisprudence on the judicial role). But cf. Ruth Gavison, The Implications of JurisprudentialTheories for Judicial Election, Selection, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617, 1632-33 (1988)
(stating the critique forwarded by legal realists, yet recognizing a broad mix of determinacy and
indeterminacy in adjudication, and as such, recognizing that at some level not all judicial decisions
are controlled by norms).
99. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative Historiesby the United States
Supreme Cowl: A StatisticalAnalysis, 9 J. LEGIS. 282, 285-290 (1982) (discussing the dominance
of statutory interpretation in cases before the Supreme Court).
100. Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12, at 402; see supra notes 7 176 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMiTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
LAW 143-60 (1990) (arguing that original understanding is the only method of constitutional interpretation that upholds the American ideal); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 829 (1986) (proposing a vision of original intent that
judges should employ "that focuses on each specific provision of the Constitution rather then upon
values stated at a high level of abstraction" when engaging in constitutional interpretation).
102. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DUKE LJ. 371, 373-74 (discussing different schools of thought regarding the use of legislative
history). Some Supreme Court Justices advocate abandoning the use of legislative history or dra-
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vocate judicially created standards that are clear and easily applied. The
success of this enterprise seems considerably in doubt. Ironically, these
attempts to restrict judicial discretion appear rather to increase it. For
example, "original intent" is as indeterminate as the techniques it replaces."' The rejection of legislative history, at least as to social legislation, increases, rather than limits, judicial discretion and enfeebles the
legislature."
Two important civil procedure decisions reflect this attempt to reassert formal limits on the courts. Justice Scalia used Burnham v. Superior
Court' to articulate a standard of due process that, at least regarding
long standing procedures of current applicability, limits the substantive
discretion of judges.'0 ' Scalia's desire to restrict the subjective assessments of individual judges regarding what is fair and just drives his
analysis.' Likewise, he emphasizes the antimajoritarian character of the
courts as well as the need for certainty of standards' In Finley v. United

matically reducing its relevance through the application of interpretative techniques that rely on the
language of statutory provisions. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
470 (1989) (Kennedy J., concurring) ("Where the language of a statute is clear in its application, the
normal rule is that we ar bound by it."); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia J.,
concurring) ('We conduct[] no separate inquiry into the intent or expectations of the signatories (of a
particular treaty) beyond those expressed in the text .... 1).
103. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 160-64 (1989) (Scalia J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "'a practical approach' to [the interpretation of] FOIA consists of following
the clear provisions of its text, and adhering to the rules we have enunciated regarding interpretation
of the unclear ones"). See generallyAntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm.
L. RE V. 1175 (1989) (exploring the dichotomy between the general rule of law and personal discretion in creation of law by the courts).
104. See James Boyle, A Processof Denial:Bork and Post-Modem Conservatism, 3 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 263, 283-90 (1991). Boyle lists six arguments against original intent, noting that it is (I)
"simply false as both a practical and philosophical matter" that the intention of the original author
must control the subsequent meaning of the text; (2) the Framers had a view of interpretation that
rejects original intent as the appropriate method of interpretation; (3) records show that the intentions
of the Framers "are often contradictory, indeterminate, or both"; (4) in those areas where their intent
is clear, such as support of slavery or belief in the inferiority of women, that intent is "morally outragenus"; (5) "the theory of original intent is inconsistent with most of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, with the vast majority of scholarly writing, with the opinions of most constitutional historians, and probably with the views of most Americans"; and (6) adoption of original intent would
involve "an impossible transition" from current interpretative practices and standards. Id. at 283-84.
Boyle notes that Bork, in The Tempting of America, "shift[s] his ground somewhat," moving to the
concept of original understanding which is the "understanding of the Constitution's contemporary
audience, rather than the intent of its original authors," id.; see id. at 284-90 (discussing the concept
and problems of original understanding). Boyle finds original understanding to be subject to the
same defects as original intent. See id. at 287-90.
105. Cf. Robert G. Vaughn, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Influence of Legislative History on
JudicialDecision-Making and Legislation,7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1996) (examining
the impact of plain meaning interpretation on the application of the British race and sex discrimination statutes and the resulting increase in judicial discretion).
106. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
107. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622-23.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 625-27.
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States," he emphasized that most federal court jurisdiction must be confened by Congress and that courts may not independently expand that
jurisdiction.'" Again, this effort regarding the power of the court over its
jurisdiction fits with the enterprise of restricting judicial discretion.
2.

Proceduralism

Sargentich's analysis would predict, in an administrative context,
that the theoretical and practical limitations on formalism would lead to
proceduralism. In this view, procedure protects the individual against the
application of the power of the state."2 Indeed, the courts rely on procedure to ensure fairness to a greater extent than the administrative process.
In fact, articulation of uniform procedure seems to have been the traditional response to the challenges of legal realism to formalism. Judith
Resnik suggests that the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was partly a response to the influence of the legal realists."' The certainty
of substantive norms, then lost, was replaced with the uniformity and
predictability of procedural rules. Of course, she is right to emphasize the
variety of influences on the rules and the fictional nature of any intent of
the advisory committee,"" but her recognition of uniform procedure as a
reaction to legal realism seems consistent with G. Edward White's description of consensus thought, which he dates somewhat later.' 5 Consensus thought also responded to the realists. Part of the response was an
emphasis on legal process and the importance of reasoned decision
making rather than fiat."' This emphasis on process and on reasoned decision making highlighted the importance of the rationale for judicial
opinions. In this sense, an obligation to expose a judge's reasoning, including the policy choices contributing to it, to rational analysis, changed
precedent from a substantive to a procedural protection. Consensus
thought, however, undermined its own agenda. Its emphasis on a rational
solution that all educated persons would arrive at so ignored conflicting
perspectives and irrational behavior that it cast doubt on the conception
of rationality supporting consensus thought. The substantive agenda of
consensus thought contained a central paradox that undermined it--the
110. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
11l. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 547-48.
112. See Sargentich, American AdninistrativeProcess,supranote 12, at 405.
113. See Judith Resnik, FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CH. L REV.
494,502-03 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, FailingFaith].
114. Id. (noting the impact of progressives and New Dealers, and the self interest of attorneymembers who had cases in federal courts in more than one state). A sense of the intellectual climate
in which the rules were developed can be gleaned from a retrospective evaluation of them. See
generally Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989) (assessing the debate concerning local, state, and federal rules of

procedure).
115. See generally G. EDWARD WHTE, TORT LAW INAMERICA: AN INTEL.CFAL HISTORY
(1985) (dating consensus thought from 1945 through 1970).
116. Seeid.atl4l.
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assumption that every problem has a consensual rational solution that
educated persons will arrive at, ignoring conflicting perspectives and
irrational behavior, ironically casting in doubt the possibility of consensus thought. The procedural responses to the limitations of formalism
remain, and concern about their viability forms an important part of the
discussion regarding civil justice reform.
Among the reforms undertaken by appellate courts, the most controversial ones reduce or eliminate oral argument and limit the publication of opinions."" Other appellate court practices include differential
tracking of appeals, the increasing use of court staff to process and
evaluate opinions, and practices where panels of judges review proposed
opinions individually without a formal conference regarding them.""
Many of the criticisms of these practices have repeated the theme that
they reduce the procedures restraining judges and thereby jeopardize the
fair and adequate consideration of individual claims." 9 For example, if
unpublished opinions are not precedent and the process leading to such
opinions differs significantly from traditional appellate procedures, critics fear that judges will be encouraged to rely on the advice of others, to
give the decisions inadequate consideration, and to indulge biases which
would otherwise be constrained by the need to live with the precedent
created.'" These practices have generated considerable academic criticism, generally without effect.'2' The acceptance of these practices shows
that the pressures on the courts have led to changes that call into doubt
many traditional procedural justice values of civil adjudication.
Perhaps of greater significance to proceduralism as a restraint has
been the loss of uniformity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Commentators identify as causes of this loss expansive interpretations of
Rule 83,'" which permits local rules not inconsistent with the general
rules of civil procedure;"n the 1992 amendments to the federal discovery
117. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 205-06 (discussing the obligations of appellate
judges); Martineau, supra note 3, at 1-5 (discussing the reform measures that appellate courts have
recently taken); Oakley, supra note 39, at 859-62 (discussing the measures used by the Ninth Circuit
for handling the increased case load); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1,at 623-25 (discussing the
validity of arguments that consider the streamlined process that is being used by the circuit courts as
a threat to the efficacy of the legal process). Federal appellate courts began by denying oral argument in a small percentage of cases that presented no real issue for decision. Today, the majority of
federal appellate cases are decided without oral argument. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 20.
118. See Hellman, supranote 7, at 299-300; Reynolds & Richman, supranote 1,at 623-24.
119. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 1,at 634 (discussing some of these critiques).
120. See id. at 633. They also note that these practices will fail to provide public accountability
for trial court errors. See id. at 635.
121. See id. One alternative to an unpublished opinion is a summary per curiam. However, an
unpublished opinion articulating the grounds for the decision might be more helpful than a summary
per curium opinion.
122. FED. R. Ctv. P. 83.
123. See Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PT. L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1995)
(discussing Rule 83); cf.Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1655, 1687-91 (1995) (discussing local rules).
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rules that allow individual districts to opt out of portions of the amendments;' and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,'" which creates rule
committees on the district level and encourages experimentation and the
development of rules related to local conditions.'" Because of the importance of uniformity in procedure as a response to the weaknesses of
formalism, the demise of uniformity portends the courts' greater vulnerability to criticisms based on the Rule of Law Ideal. Certainly, fair procedures need not be rigidly uniform, but the lack of commitment to the
ideal of uniformity highlights the discretion of specific courts and suggests indeterminacy of procedural as well as substantive standards.

The changes in appellate procedure arguably exacerbate the effects
of the loss of uniformity in procedure. To the extent that appellate procedures reduce significant review of lower courts' application of a variety
of procedures, the variation appears more likely to reduce the potential
protection of procedure in individual cases. Stephen Yeazell identifies a
larger effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--the transfer of
power from appellate to trial courts."2 In his view, this transfer of power
is the unintended result of the creation of extensive pretrial procedures.'"'
The final judgment rule insulates most of these pretrial procedures from
appellate scrutiny, thereby reducing the control of appellate courts.'"
Against this background, trial court experimentation becomes more
problematic because most of that experimentation occurs at the pretrial
level and is unlikely to be subject to significant appellate review.

124. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (amended Dec. 1, 1992); see McCabe, supra note 123, at 1689-90
(discussing the 1992 amendments to Rule 26); Tobias, supra note 123, at 812 (discussing amendments to Rule 26).
125. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
126. See Baker, Future of JudicialFederalism, supra note 32,at 779-81 (discussing implications of decentralized rulemaking and congressional activity in rlemaking spawned by the Civil
Justice Reform Act); Maull, supra note 49, at 245-47 (demonstrating, through an analysis of the
diversity of ADR procedures and their contribution to forum shopping, the negative impact of the
Civil Justice Reform Act on uniformity); McCabe, supra note 123, at 1689-91 (discussing the Civil
Justice Reform Act as a threat to uniformity); Mullenix, Separation of Powers, supra note 56, at
1287 ("More significantly, the [Civil Justice Reform Act] will contribute to the increased balkanization of federal civil procedure and transform the reigning procedural aesthetic of simplicity and
uniformity into one of increasing complexity and variation."); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and
1989 JudicialImprovements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1619-27 (1994) (discussing the causes of
lack of uniformity); Cheryl L.Haas, Note, JudicialRulemaking: Criticismsand Curesfor a System
in Crisis,70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 151-55 (1995) (noting conflict between local rules and federal
rules and discussing dangers of decentralization of rulemaking following congressional involvement); cf.Lauren Robel, FracturedProcedure:The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L
REV. 1447, 1473-83 (1994) (asserting that the Act does not compel nor authorize adoption of local
deviations inconsistent with the federal rules and does not violate the separation of powers).
127. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The MisunderstoodConsequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 631 (discussing the consequences of "redesigning the process of litigation").
128. See id. at 631-40,648.
129. See id.at 646-47.

19981

A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY

Although the Rule of Law Ideal is central to a defense of judicial
and administrative discretion, the federal courts cannot rely on its core
embodiment in the theory of legal formalism. Modem reforms also
threaten to undermine reliance on the alternative expression of procedural regularity and fairness. The assumptions regarding the value of
procedure underlying criticisms of modifications in trial and appellate
practices mirror those supporting proceduralism in the administrative
process-that procedures guarantee fair results by encouraging thorough
and thoughtful consideration of substantive decisions. The responses to
these criticisms also reflect those given to attempts to formalize more of
administrative procedure-that the burdens imposed are not worth the
price of the additional procedure. Given recent developments, the viability of proceduralism itself in the federal courts is now in question.
C. The PublicPurposesIdeal
According to Sargentich, the Public Purposes Ideal stresses the role
of administrative agencies in accomplishing important public goals."
The ideal draws on the importance attached to the affirmative tasks of
government in policy making under governing statutes. Therefore, the
core embodiment is instrumentalism, "by which is meant the familiar
notion that the significant worth of a policy inheres in its success as an
instrument of the public good." 3' Instrumentalism focuses on carrying
out the public purposes of an agency's enabling legislation, or choosing
between alternatives based on agency judgments regarding the public
good-as in cost-benefit analysis. "' The Public Purposes Ideal relies
upon official expertise as its principal methodology. 3 This methodology
manifests the ideal's reliance on technical and rational judgments to
achieve the public good.
By focusing on rational analysis, instrumentalism leads to everexpanding analytical schemes that inescapably tend to become vague and
devoid of substantive content.'" Indeed, such an approach can eventually
become the guise for political manipulation. 5 Sargentich expresses several doubts about the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis as a basis for administrative policy making. A principal normative objection is that utilitarian ethics tend to discount the power of "plural conceptions of values
[as] having distinct and independent claims of moral force."'" The
130. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supranote 12, at 410.
131. Id. at 411.
132. See id. at 411-12. Reliance on the enacting legislation of an agency and cost-benefit
analysis constitute the two principal instrumentalist approaches.See id.
133. See Sargentich, Futureof Administraive Law, supranote 14, at 774.
134. See Sargentich,American AdministrativeProcess, supranote 12,at 415-16.
135. Seeid.at416.
136. Id. at418. In addition, cost-benefit analysis assumes a limited set of preconceived aims
that cannot be derived by cost-benefit analysis. The difficulty of establishing acommon denominator
for costs and benefits and the difficulty of quantifying benefits also render determinations resting on
cost-benefit analysis suspect.
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weaknesses of instrumentalism and the limitations placed upon it by the
reality of the administrative process lead to an alternative expression of
the vision of the Public Purposes Ideal; namely, protecting the market.'"
The reliance on the market accepts private decision making as the principal determinant of the public good. Subjective preferences in the market
decide the public values to be pursued.'" This alternative expression
forecloses a significant role for the administrative process except to the
extent that the agencies intervene in response to imperfections in the
market. Issues of administrative choice become matters of economic
rationality, foreclosing other normative viewpoints.!" A variety of rationales for administrative intervention, however, suggest that such intervention may be the usual rather than the exceptional event.'"
Frug describes the expertise model as celebrating the discretion of
those within the bureaucracy.' The bureaucracy becomes a social system
in which leadership is crucial. The bureaucracy works for the public to
achieve common goals. Its internal structure must remain flexible and
responsive."2 Constituents of a bureaucracy no longer set the policies of
the organization, but become consumers of those policies." Under the
expertise model, the bureaucracy enjoys immense discretion and therefore immense power.
The immense power of the bureaucracy under the expertise model is
circumscribed by its expertise and professionalism and by the requirement of impersonal judgment.'" The model, however, is unable to draw
the line between arbitrary and proper discretion. It is unable to draw the
line between the necessary subjectivity of the members of the bureaucracy and the objective constraints upon it." Nor is the model able to
draw the same line between expertise and bias." Subjective and objective elements are so related that it is not possible to separate them. Frug

137. Seeid.at419-25.
138. See id. at 419-20.
139. C.f id. at 420 (discussing how the market imperfections allow for "room for intervention
by the administrative process").
140. See id. at 423. According to Sargentich, these include: monopoly power that forecloses

competition, natural monopolies involving economies of scale, inadequate consumer information.
externalities, unfair windfall profits, and "the perceived need to eliminate 'excessive' competition or
to moderate distributional inequities that may result.from a sudden or severe scarcity of a valued
good." Id.
141. See Fmg,Ideology of Bureaucracy,supranote 19, at 1318.
142. See id.at 1318-19.
143. Seeid.at 1320.
144. See id. at 1321-22 (arguing that these objective restraints must somehow be separated
from the subjective characteristics of bureaucratic decision making).
145. See id.at 1324-26 (explaining that it is not possible to decide which discretion is necessary and which is arbitrary, just as it is not possible to decide which restraints are excessive and
which are proper).
146. See id. at 1326-27 (explaining that expertise can be another way of describing bias-a
viewpoint or perspective based on background and experience).
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sees the call for super-experts as a response to the impossibility of the
separation-an attempt which, due to its very nature, is also doomed."
Given the contradictions inherent in the expertise model, defenders
of bureaucracy rely upon a third model, the market/pluralist model. Because the discussion here is structured around Sargentich's ideals of administrative law, this summary focuses on the market aspects of the market/pluralist model--a model which Frug applies principally to private,
not public, bureaucracies."' Still, his discussion relates the market model
to the formalist one--some "predetermined, formally realizable constituent goal,""' such as the desire to maximize stock value, is assumed, and
the corporation objectively acts to fulfill this goal."'°
1. Instrumentalism
Perceptions that the federal courts play an important, affirmative
role in American society reflect the Public Purposes Ideal. Owen Fiss's
passionate defense of the courts' responsibility to articulate and to implement constitutional values illustrates such an affirmative role."' The
separation of powers and the nature of judicial power require action for
the public good."n The role of the courts in our government uniquely
obligates them to protect the individual against the institutions of
power-both public and private." This obligation extends beyond interpretation of the Constitution to the construction and application of statutes as well.
Conservative and liberal ideologies can support a substantial affirmative role for the courts. For example, important strains of public
choice literature assert that the courts must be active in limiting the selfinterest of other branches of government, for self-interest distorts public
147. See id. at 1327-31 (explaining that the super-expert fails to resolve the conflict because of
the simultaneous need for the expert to be independent and to acquire information and expertise
about the bureaucracy).
148. See id. at 1355-62.
149. Id. at 1360.
150. See id.
151. See Fiss, Bureaucratization,supra note 1, at 1461 (describing adjudication as a constant
exercise of collective power to assure that social life conforms to public values); Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978, Term-Forword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARM. L. REV. 1, 11-18 (1979)
[hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice] (noting that courts implement public values not contained in
specific prohibitions--for example, equal protection); cf. WHIrrE, supra note 98, at 252 (describing
how appellate judicial expertise has been defined in different ways during this century-4he appellate judge has variously been described as an "oracle, social engineer, hunch player," or a "craftsman
in... 'reasoned elaboration,"-and how each of these views has been used at some time or another
to justify the exercise of judicial power).
152. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 151, at 5-9 (explaining that under modem conceptions, courts act in response to legislative failure).
153. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("Structural reform is ... distinguished by the effort to give meaning to
constitutional values in the operation of large-scale organizations."); id. at 8 (responding to the
special incentives causing bureaucracies to insulate themselves from public scrutiny); id. at 42-43
(rejecting an individualism that leaves the individual at the mercy of large concentrations of power).
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policy." The courts should require other branches to follow institutional
rules designed to control self-interest, such as the rules addressing the
internal operation of the legislature."s Some commentators argue that the
courts should actively ensure that legislative action satisfies the public
interest." Not surprisingly, adherents to the Rule of Law Ideal are unlikely to accept such a broad formulation of the judicial role.
The increasing obligation of the courts to hear "public law" litigation encourages a conception of the judicial role consistent with the Public Purposes Ideal. Abram Chayes early recognized the implications to
the federal courts of laws requiring them to articulate as well as to vindicate a variety of public policies." Other commentators have likewise
perceived the relationship between public law litigation and bureaucratic
pressures on the federal courts."
As it does in its application to the administrative process, the Public
Purposes Ideal celebrates the discretion and policy-making role of the
courts. The selection of the right people to become federal judges and the
creation of a flexible setting in which they may function is important.
Indeed, many objections to proposals to increase the number of federal
judges or to restructure the appellate courts express concerns with a resulting decline in the prestige of the federal bench and the quality of persons who will serve as judges." Unlike the Rule of Law Ideal, the Public
154. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence ofJudges: The Uses and Limitation of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 843-53 (discussing the ways in which courts fit and do not
fit the model as agents of interest groups); William C. Mitchell & Randy T. Simmons, Public Choice
and the Judiciary: Introductory Notes, 1990 BYU L. REv. 729, 737-38 (pointing out that courts,
much like bureaucracies are not elected); Linda A. Schwartzstein, Bureaucracy Unbounded: The
Lack of Effective Constraints in the Judicial Process, 35 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.597, 597-98 (1991)
(criticizing courts for removing democratic restraints for overseeing public bureaucracies).
155. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L REv. 993, 1006-11 (1988) (discussing Farber and Frickey's proposal for judicial enforcement of legislative rules).
156. See, e.g., id. at 1007 (addressing proposal for substantive judicial review of economic
legislation).
157. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281,1316 (1976).
158. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 1,at 66 (asserting that the rise of public law litigation is one of
the forces turning federal judges into administrators); Fiss, Forms ofJustice, supra note 151, at 1 14 (examining the role judicial independence must play in the judicial function); Heydebrand, supra
note 1, at 773 (noting that an important element in understanding the courts is the increasing role of
the federal government in the economy); Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8,at 323-24 (discussing the role
of public law disputes in transforming courts to an activist model); Rowe, supra note 8, at 833 (arguing that to some degree theincrease in litigation is due to the expanded reach of substantive law).
159. See, e.g., Baker, Past Extramural Reforms supra note 32, at 884 (discussing Judge Kaufman's view that the quality of judges may be adversely affected by an increase in the number of
judges); Edwards, supra note 1, at 918-19 (expressing concern that an increase in the number of
judges will lower the prestige of the judiciary); McCree, supra note I, at 782-84 (expressing concern that an increase in the number of federal judges not only lowers the status of the position, but
also creates administrative problems); Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Determining the Size of the Federal
Judiciary Requires More Than a Mission Statement, 27 CONN. L. REV. 865, 868 (1995) (expressing
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Purposes Ideal perceives the antimajoritarian character of the federal
courts not as a vulnerability, but as a significant advantage. The insulation of judges from interest group politics ensures that they can rationally
pursue sound public policy. These positions reflect the importance of
expertise and professionalism emphasized in the Public Purposes Ideal.
They also reflect its emphasis on reasoned decision making.
Instrumentalism, the core embodiment of the Public Purposes Ideal,
requires an official to ascertain the public good in order to pursue it instrumentally." Because the courts cannot look to a single statutory
scheme commissioning them, they can rely even less than administrative
agencies on enabling legislation to define the public good to be pursued
through their expertise. The Constitution as an enabling document is
simultaneously terse and broad, and could support a variety of conceptions of the public good to be pursued by the courts. Public law legislation provides somewhat more, but usually incomplete, guidance as to the
public good to be pursued by the courts in litigation invoking such legislation. The legitimacy of courts, like agencies, in applying public law
statutes rests on the success in realizing the purposes of the law. Unlike
agencies, courts make these decisions episodically not with one, but
rather with numerous similarly broad statutory mandates. As with agencies, the most likely substitute for such statements is some variant of
cost-benefit analysis.
In this context, cost-benefit analysis, as an application of instrumentalism, is closely tied to the development of the managerial role of
federal judges, particularly federal trial judges. A brief examination of
that role provides the necessary predicate to an examination of the role of
cost-benefit analysis. As illustrated below, this focus on managerial expertise shifts the view of judicial expertise from being a means to the end
of realizing the public good to being an end in itself. Managerial judging
can undermine the ideal of public purposes that justifies the courts as
instrumentalist decision makers.
Many commentators see the growing caseload as the problem confronting the federal courts. "' The Long Range Plan for the Federal

concern over the possibility that an increase in the number of judges will lead to an increase in
bureaucracy and a reduction in the quality of the judiciary). An increase in the number of judges is
likely to increase the cost and decrease the availability of benefits, such as sabbaticals, that have
been seen as important to the professional development of federal judges. Cf.IRA P. ROBBINS, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL SABBATICALS 21-57 (1987) (discussing the benefits of judicial sabbaticals
to judges and the federal courts).
160. See Sargentich,American AdministrativeProcess, supra note 12, at 411.
161. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 35, at 37 (discussing the effects of the increased caseload on a
judge's available time); Clark, supra note 1,at 149-50 (examining how the growth in caseload is
one factor which has driven bureaucratization); id. at 73 (stating that "in large measure the history of
judicial administration is the story of a fight against delay"); Edwards, supra note i, at 896 (asserting
that a rising workload creates a risk of quality in courts of appeals); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

Courts" paints a bleak picture regarding the future growth of that
caseload and its impact on the functioning of the federal courts." From
this perspective, managerial judging is principally, if not exclusively, a
response to a burgeoning caseload. The relationship between the managerial role of federal judges and increasing caseloads, however, appears
more complex-with each driving and reinforcing the other. The complexity of this relationship becomes important because so many reform
proposals, particularly ones regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction,
seem driven only by the desire to reduce caseloads-an approach to federal jurisdiction
that Martin Redish refers to as the astrological sign ap1
proach '6
Many commentators recognize that public law litigation has not
only increased caseloads but also expanded the role of the federal
courts. " Many proposals to limit federal jurisdiction, although not justified on policy grounds, presume a role for the federal courts different
from that contained in the Public Purposes Ideal. These proposals support limitations on federal jurisdiction or the restriction of public law
litigation primarily as a way of reducing caseloads. Likewise, the focus
on management finds justification in the Public Purposes Ideal. Moreover, more efficient management allows the courts, like an overburdened
agency, to direct resources to those activities in which the greatest public
good can be obtained.
In her prescient work regarding managerial judging, Judith Resnik
recognizes the relationship between that approach and an expanded affirmative role for the courts.' She also predicts, however, how that approach could actually limit the judicial role.' 7 Managerial judging, although initially connected to policy goals of the courts, hais developed a
focus on efficiency that has disconnected it, and the cost-benefit analysis
it employs, from the values that justify broad judicial discretion. This
development is predicted by Sargentich's analysis.'"
(1996) (implying that too few judges and too large a caseload has created a system geared toward
settlement).
162. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN).
163. Id. at 9-16.
164. See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of JudicialBusiness Between State and
FederalCourts: FederalJurisdictionand "The MartianChronicles," 78 VA. L. REv. 1769. 1787
(1992) (stating that an equally rational result to altering jurisdiction to achieve docket reduction
"would have been achieved by elimination of all cases brought by those born under the signs of
Pisces, Leo, and Virgo"); id. at 1831 (stating that the common problem of current jurisdictional
structure is that limitations have "no rationale other than the simple fact that they limit docket size'.
165. See sources cited supra note 158.
166. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374,377-80 (1982) [hereinafter
Resnik, ManagerialJudges].

167.

See id.

168. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 417 (examining how
the cost-benefit analysis easily becomes separated from any normative moorings as it seeks to en-
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This disconnection follows a subtle but important shift in the conception of judicial expertise contained within managerial judging. Under
instrumentalism, expertise relates to determinations of the public good.
In this context, cost-benefit analysis would be used to decide substantive
policies or standards for the public good. At an operational level, costbenefit analysis would be used to help set the priorities of the courts.
There is much to suggest that managerial judging now fails to relate to
instrumentalism in these ways. Judicial discretion now relates to an expertise in management, and as such, a matter of bureaucratic, not professional, expertise. This change in the concept of expertise risks converting
managerial judging into an end itself. Sargentich describes this same risk
in administration: cost-benefit analysis becomes a tool, rather than a rule
of decision."
Managerial judging relates to the Public Purposes Ideal in the sense
that it grants trial judges immense discretion combined with a belief in
managerial expertise. Discussions of the future of the federal courts now
incorporate the image of the judge as a manager of litigation.'"0 It is not
uncommon for federal judges to recommend the most extensive use of the
case management powers now incorporated into the federal rules.' This
view of active management combined with a recognition of inherent powers in procedural matters portends an expansion of managerial judging.
Linda Mullenix argues that the Civil Justice Reform Act strengthens
these portents by resting procedure on judicial expertise with its distinccompass more and more factors). This separation permits cost-benefit analysis to be pursued for its
own ends. Moreover, because cost-benefit analysis presumes a limited range of preconceived ends
not generated by the analysis, it can be pursued as an end in itself against these preconceptions.
169. See id. at 418-19. Because the preconceived ends of the courts contained in both formalism and instrumentalism can be pursued through cost-benefit analysis, it is not surprising that application of managerial expertise in the service of efficiency becomes self-directed. Dispute resolution,
according to established rules as well as the broader ends of instrumentalism, can be accomplished
more efficiently by a judiciary composed of capable managers.
170. See, e.g., Edith Fl. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1995) (reviewing
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS (1994), and stating that "case management has become integral to the operation of the
appellate courts"); Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 307 (stating that the Civil Justice Reform Act
"represented a formal recognition that the more traditional, passive role of the judge-a role that was
a primary value in the Anglo-American system of justice--was no longer viable under present-day
conditions"); Rogelio A. Lasso, GladiatorsBe Gone: The New DisclosureRules Compel a Reexamination ofthe Adversary Process,36 B.C. L. REv. 479, 513 (1995) (arguing that automatic disclosure
rules and new discovery rules require managerial judges because judges must necessarily be involved in the process); CJ. William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wts. L. REv. 1, 8 (stating that district judges must now see their roles as managers
and "experience some of the strong hand of management themselves. The future may require even
more dramatic changes.').
171. Cf. Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revised, and Related Rules: Analysis of Recent Developments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 157 F.R.D. 69, 75-85 (1994) [hereinafter Richey, Rule 16
Revised]; id. at 84-85 (citing examples of judicial use of case management); Charles R. Richey, Rule
16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 527 (1992) [hereinafter Richey,
Rule 16 Revisited) (discussing various case management techniques).
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tive counter-majoritarian approbation."' The decentralization of rulemaking power will only exacerbate the willingness of judges to define
procedure in terms of docket control." Decentralization delegates rulemaking power to the level most concerned with docket reduction; decentralized procedure may reflect the values of docket control rather than
other values now contained in more centralized rules. Managerial judging will overshadow other perspectives and cost-benefit analysis can
overwhelm other values including less easily quantitative concepts of
justice. The application of cost-benefit analysis to access to the courts
favors the commodification of justice, subsuming other values in this
analysis.'" Ironically, in this way managerial judging can undermine the
vision of the judiciary supported by the Public Purposes Ideal, again, a
development predicted by Sargentich's analysis.
Although many commentators express reservations about managerial judging, John Langbein strongly argues for the aggressive case management contained within the inquisitorial model of German civil procedure.'" Langbein's article exemplifies the efficiency arguments that can
be marshaled for managerial judging.' More importantly, it demonstrates how managerial judging can lead to significant alterations in the
character of the courts. He notes that the discretion inherent in the German inquisitorial system, like most European civil law systems, requires
a variety of protections including merit selection, a separate professional
cadre of judicial officials, close supervision of new judges by other
judges in a judicial hierarchy, and improved systems for the discipline of
judges.'" This aspect of his article makes the close connection between
172. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation,supra note 56, at 439 ("Federal procedural rulemaking has for the past 50 years been counter-majoritarian and predicated on a model of expertise.");
Mullenix, Separationof Powers,supra note 56, at 1336 (discussing Judge Weinstein's policy arguments on procedural rulemaking); see also Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 307 (noting that the Civil
Justice Reform Act adopts Judge Learned Hand's view that judges are active case managers); Carl
Tobias, More Modern Civil Process,56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 801,803 (1995) (emphasizing the "positive
value," as "sanctified" by the Civil Justice Reform Act, of greater rulemaking authority by local
federal courts).
173. See, e.g., Mullenix, Counter-Reformation,supra note 56, at 392 (explaining that a key
congressional policy decision behind the Civil Justice Reform Act was to "promulgate a national,
statutory policy in support of judicial case management more extensive than what the current federal
rules require").
174. See Clark, supra note 1,at 77 ("The promotion of efficiency in the judiciary cannot be
accomplished without cost and sacrifice of other important values.").
175. See Langbein, supranote 1, at 824-25.
176. See id. at 826-41 (exemplifying, in part, by contrasting the American approach to the
German approach). Joseph Weis argues that civil law systems may require more judges because ot
the more extensive involvement of judges in cases. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1385, 1389 (1992). A substitute for an increase in the number of judges is an
increase in the number of subordinate judicial officials.
177. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 848-51. However, the possibility of interest group influence exists in a civil law system. See, e.g., Carlo Guamieri, Justice and Politics: The ItalianCase in
a ComparativePerspective,4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.REv. 241,252 (1994) (noting the proliferation
of connections between the larger political environment and the Italian judiciary); id. at 251-53
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management responsibilities and the treatment of judges as civil
servants,'' a treatment common in civil law countries. " The reality of
increased discretion drives the project seeking greater accountability and
control. His proposals, like the expertise model in general, would lodge
this control in objective professional standards.
Todd Peterson's evaluation of how managerial judging has altered
many of the traditional checks on the judiciary also recognizes the importance of accountability and control.'" Likewise, it ties that control to
the development of bureaucratic structures. Peterson argues that managerial judging reduces or eliminates such traditional checks on trial judges
as precedent, appellate review, and juries."' He proposes using magistrate
judges to control the pretrial process, thereby substituting review by federal trial judges for the more traditional checks imposed on trial judges."
The limitations imposed on these magistrate judges would be professional in character." Peterson's suggestions as well as Langbein's recommendation for civil service accountability both accept the need for
impersonal judgment and seek to reduce the scope within which personal
bias can operate."
Given the concerns about the control of discretion and the elimination of bias, the renewed interest in judicial discipline'" comes as little

(describing the impact of organized factions within the Italian judiciary); Vaughn, JudicialReform,
supra note 94, at 582-88 (describing how bureaucratic organization and personnel practices created
a conservative state bureaucracy ill-equipped to respond to violations of human rights).
178. See Langbein, supranote 1, at 826-41.
179. See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling Through ContinentalLegal Systems, 43 U. PrTT.
L. REV.935, 991-93 (1982) (suggesting that training within a bureaucracy affects outlook and limits
contact with real life); David S.Clark, The Selection andAccountability ofJudges in West Germany:
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat,61 S.CAL L. REv. 1795, 1846 (1988) (noting that sociological
research over the last 40 years shows West German judges to be conservative and authoritarian);
Heydebrand, supra note 1, at 763 (commenting that such structures risk turning courts into another
arm of the state and in civil law countries "judges tend to be bureaucratically oriented and have a
comparatively low-paid civil service status").
180. See Peterson, supranote 3, at 45-46, 91-92.
181. Id. at 45; see also RiCHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2, at 172 (stating that the potential
for extensive pretrial more clearly makes the individual judge the decision maker); Harlon Leigh
Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE LJ.62,92 (1985) (discussing
reasons "to question the intuitively appealing notion that the threat of reversal induces trial judges to
self-correct).
182. See Peterson, supra note 3, at 95. See generally R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the
FederalMagistrateJudge in Civil Justice Reform, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 799 (1993) (asserting that
because magistrate judges are directly accountable to trial judges in ways that trial judges are not
accountable to appellate courts, magistrate judges may be encouraged to eliminate cases at the pretrial stage as part of a team effort to reduce congestion).
183. Cf.Peterson, supra note 3, at 95-100. Peterson's discussion shows that the restraints
would be professional in character because they rest on review of the magistrate judge's decisions
using the criteria applicable to well conceived and presented decisions of a professional. See id.
184. See Langbein, supra note I, at850-55; Peterson,supra note 3, at 95.
185. See WHEE u & LEVIN, supra note 57, at v (noting "sustained interest in new forms of
judicial discipline and removal has existed in the United States for the last two decades"); see also
JAMES R. BROWNING Fl"AL., FED. JUDICIAL CR.,ILLusmATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS
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surprise. The literature contains a variety of proposals for improving the

discipline of judges, including federal judges."6 The coincidence of the
growth in managerial judging and the renewed interest in judicial discipline hints at an important connection. This coincidence reflects a relationship between the vision of the judiciary contained in the Public Purposes Ideal and the need to limit and control the discretion validated by
that vision.
The instrumentalist vision of agency behavior justifies considerable
secrecy. Secrecy protects the expertise and discretion of members of the
bureaucracy. In part, it insulates rational decision making based on that
expertise from political pressures and from the "irrationality" of custom
and existing social conventions." In this way, instrumentalism exalts
efficiency above the competing interests of openness. The Rule of Law
Ideal and the Democratic Process Ideal place much greater value on
openness. Publicity provides a method of insuring that decisions fall
within the boundaries created by legal standards, and openness is important both to public participation and to political oversight.
In theory, much of the judicial process is open. Traditional views
regarding the importance of public trials and the increasing use of cameras in courtrooms permit, if not encourage, public examination of the
judicial process." Opinions, briefs, and a variety of discovery documents
are part of a public record." Although the deliberative process, particularly
for appellate courts, remains closed as do the deliberations of juries (book
contracts aside), the judicial process has traditionally been more open than

OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY at vii-ix (1986) (describing the citizen complaint
mechanism and the goal of reasonable response to citizens who invoke it); Sahl, supra note 57, at
194-95 (suggesting courts increasingly have been subjected to public scrutiny); Williams, supra
note 57, at 906-07 (noting recent charges of "bad behavior" made against members of the federal
judiciary).
186. See, e.g., WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57,at 4-6 (discussing disciplinary proposals and
tracing historically the development of mechanisms for discipline); Sahl, supranote 57,at 199-200
(stressing need for more openness and public scrutiny of disciplinary procedures); Williams, supra
note 57, at 899-903 (discussing the need to deal effectively with race and gender bias complaints
and the need for procedures with respect to Supreme Court Justices).
187. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supranote 12, at 415.
188. See generally Elizabeth M. Hodgkins, Throwing Open a Window on the Nation's Courts
by Lifting the Ban on FederalCourtroomTelevision, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89 (1995) (discussing the progression of television in courtroom from its historical beginnings to the present); Angeliquo M. Paul, Turning the Cameraon Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About the
Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. LJ.655 (1997) (discussing whether Court TV is educating the public).
189. For example, the discovery rules assume that discovery information will be public absent
direction to the contrary. However, the common law and constitutional rights to discovery material
are limited. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 10-14 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that
First Amendment and common law rights of public access to judicial proceedings "do[] not extend
to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings").
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many executive bureaucracies, where legislation and litigation have been
required in order to obtain access to meetings and to documents.'"
The impact of managerial judging on openness illustrates the relationship between in'ttrumentalism and secrecy. Managerial judging removes the activity of judges from public view. Commentators emphasize
that managerial judging operates in the pretrial process, a process closed
to the public and in which little, if any, record is kept.' The replacement
of a public trial process with a closed pretrial one reduces not only the
opportunity for public view, but also the rationale for openness as well. If
some of the benefits of managerial judging rely on the involvement of
the judge in ways that influence the parties in the course of the litigation,
those benefits might be lost if the judge were limited by the restrictions
that openness might place on that role. The literature contains proposals
for greater openness in the pretrial process, in the selection process, and
in the disciplining of judges."9
The recent controversy regarding secrecy in litigation also seems
tied to the Public Purposes Ideal and stresses that the pretrial process is
generally closed to public scrutiny. The advocates of Sunshine in Litigation provisions" argue that protective orders, sealing of records, and
confidential settlements prevent the public and regulatory agencies from
receiving important, perhaps life-saving, health and safety information.'
They propose provisions that restrict the ability of judges to issue such
orders but grant judges the power to review confidentiality provisions in
settlements."" Arthur Miller's resistance to the application of such proposals in the federal courts rests heavily upon a defense of the discretion

190. The history of the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), is instructive. See generallyAmerican Bar Association'sSymposium on the 25th Anniversary of the Freedom
of Information Act, 9 GOV'T INFO. Q. 223 (1992) (providing a discussion of the history and the
operation of the FOIA).
191. See, e.g., Kipp & Lewis, supranote 8, at 331-32 (noting literature discussing how Rule 16
takes case management out of public view with no obligation for reasoned written opinions and how
this secrecy is accompanied by the lack of procedural safeguards); Resnik, ManagerialJudges,
supra note 166, at 425-26 (remarking on one judge's case management decisions as "off the record
and beyond the reach of appellate review').
192. Cf. Resnik, FailingFaith, supranote 113, at 494-98 (outlining tasks and choices that must
be undertaken to improve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Resnik, ManagerialJudges, supra
note 166, at 380 (noting that managerial judging may be redefining what is fair and rational adjudication); Sahi, supra note 57, at 199 (arguing that more open process would better serve judiciary's
reputation).
193. See, e.g., S. 374, 104th Cong. (1995) (unenacted federal Sunshine in Litigation bill).
194. See generally SOC'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, Ass'N OF TRIAL LAwYERS OF AM.,
KEEPING SECRETS: JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1990) (arguing that policy interests, for the most part, should
take precedence over privacy rights).
195. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that no court may enter an
order which would conceal a public hazard or which would result in public hazard); TEX. R. OF CIv.
P. 76(a) (stating that court records may not be sealed if sealing will have an adverse effect upon
general public health unless clearly outweighed by substantial specific interest).
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of trial judges." This defense repeats the themes of the Public Purposes
Ideal including professional restraints, the expertise of judges, and the
efficiency of the trial process.
Proposals requiring that trial judges review confidentiality provisions demand separate examination. These proposals involve the court in
private settlements in order to vindicate the public interest-powers that
fit nicely within the view of the courts under the Public Purposes Ideal.
Because managerial judging may often intimately involve courts in the
settlement process leading to such agreements, these proposals can be
viewed as limitations on judicial power as well as its expansion. In light
of the discussion above, however, both conceptions seem linked to the
role of the courts contained in the Public Purposes Ideal.
Managerial judging invokes many of the fears of abuse suggested
by the Public Purposes Ideal. The failure of cost-benefit analysis to establish the public good to be implemented by the courts leads to techniques of bureaucracy to control the exercise of judicial discretion. Sargentich would predict that the limitations of instrumentalism would lead
to the alternative expression of the Public Purposes Ideal--the market.'"
Before examining how proposals for reform incorporate this alternative
expression, I turn briefly to Frug's description of responses of the expertise model to the failure to draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate discretion and between expertise and bias.
Frug states that the inability to draw lines between subjectivity and
objectivity would lead to attempts to recreate some type of objective
limits.'" In fact, one of his examples, the creation of "Super-Experts,""
finds several analogies in the proposals for reform of the federal courts,
including the use of court appointed experts, the creation of panels of
experts to examine scientific and technical claims, and the establishment
of courts with specialized expertise." Frug argues that this attempt to
rely on super-experts will likewise fail because it again requires the
drawing of lines between functions that contain both the objective and
the subjective.?'

196. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Ordersand Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 428-32 (1991).
197. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12,at 419-20.
198. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supra note 19, at 1318-34 (discussing various realworld ramifications of the expertise model).
199. Id.at 1327-31.
200. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 53 (discussing issues with specialized courts); Smith,
supra note 52, at 458-70 (discussing selection of juries based on education and experience); The
CivilJury, supra note 52, at 1459 (discussing use of specialized panels); infra notes 249-51,278-82

and accompanying texL
201. Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1330-31. The conflict between the
requirements of an independent and informed super-expert "merely reproduces the discussion of the
expertise/bias distinction." Id. at 1330.
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More basically, Frug's examination of the judicial review model as
a control of bureaucracy casts doubt on the efficacy of judicial restraints
on public and private bureaucracies. The imposition of such restraints
forms an important component for the affmnative role of the federal
courts.' The judicial review model must draw a line between the role of
the court and the role of the bureaucracy. In so doing the court can rely
on formalist and expertise views of the court, each of which can be interpreted to either expand or contract the scope of judicial review. The court
can also draw on formalist and expertise models of the bureaucracy, each
of which can again be interpreted to expand or contract the scope of bureaucratic action.' The combination of these possibilities explains ex*isting doctrines of judicial review and demonstrates why the judicial review model cannot effectively control bureaucracies. '
2. The Market
Traditionally, settlement could be seen as reliance on private decision making in which the parties independently examine the alternatives
available and choose those alternatives that best fulfill their subjective
values.' Conceived in this way, settlement seems analogous to marketgrounded decision making; that is, courts provide a framework of rules
that support this private decision making and ensure adequate information for the determination of rational choice.' Even provisions for some
public expenditure for these alternatives do not alter their basic private
character. This conception of settlement and the role of the courts in it
can be seen to be inconsistent with the vision of the role the courts contained in the Public Purposes Ideal. Owen Fiss's critique of settlement '
demonstrates how advocates of the Public Purposes Ideal can perceive
settlement as potentially undermining the involvement of the courts in
addressing public values and public rights.
Managerial judging alters the character of settlement; because the
judge "encourages" settlement, settlement becomes court-directed. Indeed, managerial judges may move beyond facilitating settlements to
influencing the content of settlements.' Many settlements may include

202. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
203. See Frug, Ideology ofBureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1334-43.
204. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Gross & Syvemd, supra note 161, at 3-4 (noting that party control inherent in the
American legal system engenders settlement).
206. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 607-15 (Aspen Law & Bus. 5th
ed. 1998) (1974) (noting the importance of litigation in setting roles for settlement even if most cases
are settled).
207. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
208. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1821-22 (listing judicial pressure to settle cases among the
reasons why "the defects of America's adjudicative system have distorted the settlement process");
Marc Galanter, A Settlement Judge Not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12
J.L. & Soc'y I (1985) (discussing the powerful influence of judges in directing parties toward
settlement); Gross & Syverud, supra note 161, at 2-4 (describing incentives for judicial encourage-
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provisions reflecting not just the subjective values of the parties but the
perspectives and experience of the judge. Conceived in this way, settlement seems less analogous to the market and more reflective of judicial
instrumentalism.
In a similar way, perceptions of alternative dispute resolution oscillate between instrumentalism and market analogies. ADR can be seen as
privatization of the judicial mechanism. The parties choose, based on
their values and interests,' from a variety of techniques of dispute resolution. ADR not only rests this choice with the parties, but also provides
methods of resolution that give the parties more control over the process
of resolution. For example, even with arbitration, one of the more formal
options provided by alternative dispute resolution, the parties can choose
the decision maker, can influence, if not control, the standards to be applied, and can tailor process and procedure to their individual needs. 1"
Under traditional rules, courts may only intervene in circumstances that
suggest the equivalent of market failure-where the arbitration is fundamentally unfair or deviates from the agreement of the parties."' As with
market analogies of settlements, advocates of the Public Purposes Ideal
can perceive ADR as a threat to the public responsibilities of the courts,
responsibilities that go beyond the resolution of an individual case to
implementation of judicial conceptions of the public good. Suggestions
that arbitration should not be permitted in certain types of public law
litigation, such as employment discrimination,2 ' rest not only upon a
belief that the agreements to arbitrate may be an abuse of the superior
bargaining power of employers, but also upon a conviction that such
litigation should involve public judgments made through public officials,
particularly judges." The suggestion that public law standards bind arbi-

ment of settlements); Richey, Rule 16 Revised, supra note 171, at 71 (advocating greater judicial
involvement in pretrial). But cf.Dessem, supra note 182, at 819 ("Since most judges do not discuss
settlement with counsel in cases over which they may preside at trial, a judge other than the trial
judge is needed to preside over judicially-hosted settlement conferences.").
209. See, e.g., Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA. J.INT'L L. 167,200 (1995) (noting use of alternative dispute resolution in Latin America
as a response to "delays and corruption that characterize the formal judicial system"); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 113, at 537 (showing that managerial judging and alternative dispute resolution
share the view that disposition by the parties' consent is preferable to adjudication); Weis, supra
note 176, at 1387 (discussing innovative procedures available in alternative dispute resolution).
210. Cf. Dakolias, supra note 209, at 200-01 (asserting that the flexibility and party-based
control that ADR offers has led to the willingness of Latin American parties to choose this method
as opposed to traditional judicial procedures); Weis, supra note 176, at 1387 (proposing that party
agreement allows experimentation).
211. Cf. Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath ofGilmer,
40 ST. Louis U. LJ.77, 95-99 (1996) (noting limited procedural safeguards for arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994)).
212. See generally id. at 77-78 (discussing controversy, in the wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), surrounding mandatory arbitration of employment
claims).
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trators in employment discrimination cases relies on similar instrumentalist perspectives. 1 "

Mandatory alternative dispute resolution prior to proceeding in the
courts is not a market alternative but rather the application of instrumentalist principles. Indeed, the view that such mandatory provisions are
really consumer driven echoes instrumentalist descriptions of bureaucratic activity. 1" It assumes that consumers of dispute resolution services
want the most efficient service and that the courts using their experience
and expertise determine what services best serve which groups of consumers."' Although the mandatory ADR provisions under the Civil Justice Reform Act, which rest the requirement on the amount in controversy,7 belie any careful consideration of consumer interests, they still
reflect judicial judgments about the appropriateness of different forms of
dispute resolution.

213. See, e.g., David S.Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of CompelledArbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36-39
(focusing on superior bargaining power of employers, particularly in the context of pre-dispute
agreements, noting such agreements are a form of corporate "self-deregulation," and emphasizing
that these clauses remove important public rights from the courts); cf.Edwards, supra note 1, at 928
(arguing that significant public rights should not be limited "by those whom the law seeks to regu-

late").
214. Cf. Baker, Past ExtramuralReforms, supra note 32, at 872-73 (expressing concern about
the effect of arbitration on underlying legal norms); Breyer, supra note 35, at 44 (emphasizing the
importance of just settlement in disputes potentially leading to litigation, and the fact that there is
uncertainty whether ADR leads to such just settlement); Judge G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions-Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker'sReformation Model for FederalDistrict
Courts, 46 SMU L. REv. 1935, 1940-41 (1993) (criticizing judges' ability to require alternative
dispute resolution as opposed to a traditional trial); Malin, supra note 211, at 100-02 (emphasizing
the role of courts and the important public function of judges, noting that arbitrators are outside the
public justice system, and arguing that private arbitral interpretation of Title VII can undermine
uniform federal labor standards).
215. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR Lr'IGATION MANAGEMENT AND COST AND
DELAY REDUCTION 2 ("Case management must be directed at tailoring dispute resolution procedures
and techniques to the available resources and needs of the case."); Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1840
(arguing that mandatory arbitration reduces backlogs and users of arbitration have high levels of
satisfaction); Breyer, supra note 35, at 44-45 (discussing the possible unfairness of mandatory,
alternative dispute resolution); Judge R. Allan Edgar, A Judge's View-ADR and the Federal
Courts-The Eastern District of Tennessee, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 995, 995-97 (1996) (suggesting
that a benefit of using alternative dispute resolution is quality, as well as efficiency); Justice Penny J.
White, Yesterday's Vision, Tomorrow's Challenge: Case Management and Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Tennessee, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 957, 961 (1996) (discussing the Tennessee courts'
ability to provide appropriate dispute resolution and public perception that ADR is less expensive,
more efficient, and more satisfactory than litigation).
216. See generally Rowe, supra note 8, at 828 (discussing whether litigation or ADR is the
most efficient way to handle disputes).
217. See, e.g., E.D. PA. Civ. R. 8 (mandating mediation for cases involving disputes of less
than $100,000). See generally Maull, supranote 49, at 246-52 (describing alternative dispute resolution processes adopted under the Civil Justice Reform Act, including the Pennsylvania provision
cited above); id. at 253 CEach of the principal ADR processes is mandatory in at least one districr.'). The courts' attraction to alternative dispute resolution may rest on ADR's ability to remove
cases from the courts and to reduce dockets, for many cases that are sent to alternative dispute resolution do not return to the courts.
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To the extent that alternative dispute resolution can be described as
a market alternative, it remains vulnerable to criticism from advocates of
instrumentalism. To the extent that ADR seems to be the application of
instrumentalism relying on the discretion and expertise of judges, it is
vulnerable to critics of state intervention and the advocates of marketbased alternatives. In either instance, the Public Purposes Ideal and this
way of talking about bureaucracy collectively illuminate the values at
issue.
The Public Purposes Ideal conceives a radically different role for
the courts than the Rule of Law Ideal."" The Public Purposes Ideal celebrates discretion, while the Rule of Law Ideal shuns it.219 For this reason,
the Public Purposes Ideal places the discussion regarding managerial
judging within a normative framework that contrasts sharply with that
encountered in the Rule of Law Ideal---a normative framework that
generates different arguments and different concerns. The Rule of Law
Ideal opposes the broad judicial decision making inherent in the Public
Purposes Ideal. It opposes judicial policy making rather than judicial
application of existing standards." On the other hand, the Public Purposes Ideal opposes the narrow and constricted view of the judicial role
advocated by the Rule of Law Ideal.' Both the Rule of Law and the
Public Purposes Ideal, however, perceive the judicial role for good or ill
as countermajoritarian.' In this regard, they both conflict with the
Democratic Process Ideal.'m
D. The Democratic Process Ideal
According to Sargentich, the Democratic Process Ideal rests on a
participatory and representative decision-making process in which
agency officials consider the views of those affected by administrative
decisions.' This ideal sees the administrative process primarily as a pluralist political process because its core embodiment relies on public participation in that process.' Public participation conflicts with the bureaucratic structure of administrative decisions, and challenges the principle that public employees are politically neutral actors. A number of
practical and policy considerations also limit the possibility of wide pub-

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supranote 12,at 411.
See id.
Cf.id.
(discussing the nature of the Public Purposes Ideal).
See id.at 397.
See id. at 411.
See id.
See id. at 425.

225.

Seeid.

226.

See id. at 426-27.
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lic participation. For example, the limited resources of many interest
groups will prevent them from meaningfully participating in the administrative process.' Indeed, the need for administrative discretion in deciding which groups to permit to participate, and which, if any, groups to
subsidize, involves nondemocratic decisions by agency officials.'
Given the restraints on the core embodiment of participation, the
Democratic Process Ideal offers an alternative expression of oversight by
politically responsible officials.'m This alternative expression, of course,
abandons direct public participation central to the ideal. It also rests on
doubtful assumptions about the responsiveness of the President and Congress "to a full range of public interests." " The methodology of this
ideal is politics: the process of balancing and compromising affected
interests."2 This methodology manifests the judgment that the administrative process is a political one.
As part of the market/pluralist model, Frug critiques the view that
"demands of the political process can (or do) protect the constituents of
the bureaucracy from domination by bureaucratic officials." ' He notes,
as does Sargentich, that participation in bureaucratic decision making
requires an identification of the relevant interests, a description of the
nature of their participation, and rules to resolve conflicts between the
various interests. ' Each of these issues, he believes, creates a subjective/objective combination that potentially undermines the model. ' For
example, because every interest group cannot participate, the choice of
the relevant groups requires an objectification by the bureaucracy of the
subjective desires of the people.m The character of interest group participation combines the insight that interest groups represent narrow subjective interests while together they represent the objective constituency of
the agency."' The rules of interest group conflict cannot be objective, but
must chose between views of formal equality of groups or real equality---considering financial resources, organization, and other social
capital-a choice that will lead to radically different outcomes. ' Rather

227. See id. at 428-29. Sargentich notes that "despite the continuing power of the democratic
process ideal, the gap between its core embodiment and the existing process is so profound that the
core, if fully realized, would radically transform rather than merely reform it."Id. at 429.
228. See id. at 430.
229. See id. at 43 1.
230. See id. at 431-38.
231. Id. at 436.
232. See Sargentich, Futureof AdministrativeLaw, supra note 14, at 774-75.
233. Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supra note 19, at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. See id. at 1368-69.
235. See id. at 1369.

236.

See id.

237. See id. at 1371 (asserting the theory that interest groups are therefore alternatively described "as representatives of subjective desire and representatives of objective neutrality").
238. Cf. id. at 1372 (discussing how, within the pluralist mechanism, specified.rules must be
implemented). As Frug notes:
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than participation within the bureaucracy, Frug advocates participatory
decision making that would serve to undermine rather than the support
the legitimacy of bureaucracies.'s
1. Participation
The Democratic Process Ideal seems particularly ill-suited to a discussion of the future of the federal courts. The Constitution gives federal
judges tenure on good behavior for life and limits the ability of Congress
to reduce the salaries of judges.' These provisions implement an attempt
to insulate judges from much of interest group politics. Although some
states provide for the popular election of judges," and many others require judges to stand against their record for re-election,' the role of
judges contained in the Rule of Law Ideal and the Public Purposes Ideal
so dominates our perceptions of federal judges that these other methods
of judicial selection and accountability appear notable principally as examples of the risks of corruption and politicization of judges posed by
the application of electoral practices to the courts.' Direct interest group
participation seems anathema to a perception of the judge, either as a
neutral arbitrator applying formal standards to individual cases, or as a
disinterested expert policymaker or judicial manager.
Simply sketching these three solutions to the problem of class differences-disregarding
them, financing the poor, reorganizing the economic structure-should demonstrate the
range of possible rules for interest group conflict. ... These rules create not a neutral arbiter but a battleground for determining the kinds of messages that will influence the bureaucratic process.
Id. at 1373.
239. See Id. at 1370.
240. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (Compensation Clause) ("The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."). On three particular occasions, federal judges have challenged actions that they argued
reduced their salaries, including failure of Congress to increase salaries with the rate of inflation. See
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,218 (1980); Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626,629-30 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1045, 1048 (Ct. Cl. 1977), overruled by American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, 806 F.2d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See generally THE
FEDERAUST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (asserting that judges are entitled to fair compensation
that should not be lowered).
241. See Schwartz, supranote 57, at M2 (noting that 21 states popularly elect judges).
242. See id. (noting that 38 states require judges to run against their records); see a/ro
WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 8 (stating that most states have such a provision at least in
some courts and that seven states have popular recall provisions for judges).
243. See, e.g., WHEELER & HARRISON, supranote 7, at 6 (noting that at the time of the Constitution, state legislatures appointed judges in most states and approximately half had the power of
removal); Epstein, supra note 154, at 840-41 (suggesting how appointment rather than election of
judges limits application of some aspects of public choice); Langbein, supra note 1, at 853-54 (expressing hesitation in having elected Illinois state court judges exercise powers through German-type
civil procedure, as a large number of Chicago judges ar indicted for corruption, yet noting that
"[riemodeling of civil procedure is intimately connected to improvement in the selection ofjudges");
Wilkinson, supra note 1,at 1156-57 (implying concern about an elected judiciary adjudicating civil
rights and liberties). But see, e.g., Guamieri, supra note 177, at 251-54 (describing how factions and
interest group politics have arisen in the appointed Italian judiciary).
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The federal courts, however, contain two institutions, both ancient
in origin, that rely on public participation in the judicial process. Until
recently, these two institutions-the lay jury in civil actions and the adversary system-have seemed inextricably linked to American conceptions of civil litigation. The Seventh Amendment protects the role of the
lay jury'" and centuries of tradition and the assumptions of civil procedure buttress the adversary role.
The civil jury involves members of the public-usually persons
without legal training or experience in the judicial process. Ideally, juries
are representative of the community at large, and the authority of their
judgment lies in good part on their representative character.' A substantial body of law and practice seeks to insure that representative
character 4' and the current controversy about the status of the peremptory
challenge can be viewed as illustrative of the importance placed on the
jury as a surrogate for the community.' In addition, because juries are
not part of any judicial bureaucracy, they serve as community observers
whose presence alone helps to validate the judicial process.' Even in
civil litigation they can perform as dispensers of justice by avoiding the
harshness of established rules.
Indeed, juries embody participatory decision making; they are important decision makers, not simply advisers to others. In this sense, juries offer an example of public participation unlike any in administrative
agencies. The decision-making powers of juries have engendered a
framework of trial and appellate procedures designed to limit and control
that power.' Much of civil procedure chronicles the attempts by the judiciary to constrain popular decision making that often lies at the heart of
civil trials. At different stages in American history, public responses to

244. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ...the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
Sates, than according to the rules of the common law.").
245. Cf. RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 2, at 174 (insinuating that although the federal
courts represent the very embodiment of legal order, they also represent institutions intrinsically
linked to popular democracy); Eisele, supra note 214, at 1977 (discussing the jury as a political
institution crucial to a heterogeneous, democratic community committed to protecting the interests
of "outs"). Akhil Reed Amar and Alan Hirsch contend that the Constitution originally conceived the
jury as an institution of self-government that would check the power of judges. See AKHIL REED
AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR

RIGHTS 52-53 (1998).
246. See, e.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871 (1994) (establishing guidelines for the selections of grand and petit juries in federal courts).
247. See supranote 54.
248. See, e.g., Weis, supra note 176, at 1390-91 (suggesting that litigants may more readily
accept the judgment of juries because of anonymity, lack of continuity, and the fact that jurors "are
perceived as having no interest in the outcome of the case').
249. This framework consists of the Rules of Evidence, presumptions, elements of claim,
instructions, Rule 49, directed verdict, judgment as a matter of law, and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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these attempts' have generated political controversy and significant legal responses."l
Likewise, the adversary process can be justified as an institution of
public participation in the judicial process. Commentators have expressly
linked this process to the protection of individual rights and the furtherance of individual autonomy.' The individual, through her representative, plays an important role in the determination of her claim. The adversary process, like any scheme of participation, addresses basic issues
regarding which persons or interests will have an opportunity to present
views to an official decision maker, what will be the character of the
participation, and what will be the rules of conflict between representatives of different groups. Because federal courts act only upon cases or
controversies brought before them, the participation of others is necessary to invoke judicial power. The courts are reactive and lack the proactive powers of most administrative agencies.
In courts, the rules of participation are quite democratic. Any person
who has a claim within the competence of the court may bring that
claim. "3 The parties decide what interests to represent and the parties
initiate the process. Individuals can bring claims that affect large segments of the public, and these actions are clearly representative in their
character. For example, the civil rights litigation leading to Brown v.
Boardof Education' used individual plaintiffs in cases where the interests of millions were asserted.' Class litigation more explicitly accepts
this representative role, and the adequacy of representation is not only a

250. See, e.g., AMuz. CONST. art. XVIII, § 5 (containing populist provisions that prohibit judges
from directing verdicts on the issue of contributory negligence); OKLA. CONST. art. XXI, § 6
(stating that the defense of contributory negligence shall be a question of fact left to the jury).
251. See, e.g., Noel Fidel, Preeminently a PoliticalInstitution: The Right of Arizona Juries to
Nullify the Law of ContributoryNegligence, 23 ARIZ. ST. U. 1,1 (1991) (discussing the power of
juries to reach verdicts that may be "inconsistent with the traditional application of facts to the law").
252. See, e.g., Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 308 (arguing that individual autonomy is vindicated in individuals invoking the judicial process and in individuals retaining control over all relevant aspects of the process); id. at 347-48 (criticizing the Civil Justice Reform Act on the ground
that the Act "represents a clear diminution in the absolute autonomy of individuals who invoke the
civil justice system," but implying that the Act could increase substantive liberty, "namely access to
a more meaningful federal civil adjudicative process").
253. For general comments dealing with court openness, accessibility, and accountability, see
Martineau, supra note 3, at 11-13 (stressing that oral argument is needed for institutional purposes
of openness and accountability); id. at 19-20 (analyzing participation as a value supporting oral
argument in light of the need of courts to deal with sharply increased appellate caseload); Meyer,
supra note 1,at 662 (commenting favorably on the greater accessibility of the courts compared with
legislatures); Redish, supra note 164, at 1776-77 (addressing arguments that advocate a role for
consumer choice in shaping jurisdiction); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 113, at 504-05 (describing central consideration of the adversary process in the drafting of the federal roles).
254. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
255. See generally RIcHARD KLUGER,SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCAION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (addressing, among other
things, the fact that Brown was a consolidated opinion).
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constitutional touchstone but also a*preeminent requirement of federal
procedure.' Clearly, some persons seek to represent only themselves,
while many cases are driven by interest group considerations rather than
the desires of the individual party. Within this range, however, representation of others seems more common and less the exception. Although
professional representation is not a prerequisite to such participation, as a
practical matter, professional representation is usually a necessity. Not
surprisingly, litigation in the United States becomes an important form of
interest group activity. Many factors influence this use of litigation but
the ease of participation is particularly important.
Participation by litigants representing different groups also serves to
educate judges about the interests and problems of broad segments of the
public. The breadth of this education can create a democratic bias in
judges who see the claims of all groups and social classes. For example,
one long-standing critique of the Chilean judiciary was its separation
from the concerns and interests of the vast majority of Chileans.' Many
believed that this insulation from the polity of the state contributed to the
inability of the judiciary to respond to the human rights abuses of the
military regime.' Proposals for reform in Chile seek to increase public
participation in the courts as a way of inculcating democratic values in
judges.'
Attempts to limit access to the courts can appear undemocratic, and
therefore provoke especially strong reactions. These attempts can take
the form of reducing the ability of individuals to raise the interests of
others. Both the controversy and confusion of the Supreme Court's
standing decisions demonstrate the difficulties when the court seeks to
articulate standards for participation.' These attempts can also seek to
discourage the use of the courts by certain groups or interests. A strong
undercurrent of the discussion of civil justice reform proposals, particularly those proposals affecting access to the courts, articulates the suspi256. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. Of course, class actions can prevent or limit the participation by
members of the class in independent litigation. The limitation on participation is especially true for
those class actions seen as mandatory and in which the members of the class are not given an op-

portunity to opt out. See id.
257. See Vaughn, JudicialReform, supra note 94, at 587-88.
258. See id. at 588 (noting the commonly held view of the Chilean Judiciary-that it "used
formalism to justify its conservative biases," in turn ignoring or condoning human rights abuses at
the time of the military regime).
259. See id. at 595-96.
260. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and
Article III Standing Analysis After Bennet v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 764-75 (1997) (discussing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on standing that "raises difficult separation of powers
and interpretation issues, and potentially results in even more skewed standing criteria... disfavoring claims brought by the beneficiaries of regulation"); Edwards, supra note 1, at
907-09 (discussing the possible intentions behind the Supreme Court's approach to standing, section
1983, habeas corpus, class actions and implied private rights of action). "ITihe Supreme Court has
endeavored to alter the litigation-producing nature of prior doctrines and to replace those doctrines
with litigation limiting or door closing rules .... "d.
I at 908.
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cion that these proposals are intended to make the courts less hospitable
to consumer and civil rights litigants, thereby reducing the participation
of these interests."'
The adversary process also establishes extensive individual control
over the character of participation. Adversarial procedural rules rely on
the adversaries to choose the judicial forum, to investigate independently, to control the collection of information, to structure litigation positions, to frame issues, and to present arguments supporting their respective party's position." In addition, adversaries possess ways of directly
influencing decision makers: arguments, questions to witnesses, selection
of jurors, use of experts, and the preparation of written briefs.' Appellate

261.

See. e.g., EuzABm PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, 14 ALTERNATIVEs To HIGH COsT

LMGATION 10-11 (1996) (discussing the impact of user fees in ADR); Alschuler, supra note 7, at
1814 (discussing how plaintiffs are adversely affected by increasing the costs of justice and that
"[wlrongdoers would be required to 'internalize' a smaller portion of the cost that their conduct has
inflicted on others"); Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.SA., 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1996)
(arguing mediation as a rebuke of an inefficient adversary legal system in a state-by-state survey of
mediation provisions); Hensler, supra note 8, at 249 (noting that the Council on Competitiveness'
proposals "seek to change the current balance between individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants, in favor of the latter"); Patrick E.Longan, Congress, the Courts and the Long Range Plan, 46
AM. U. L. REv. 625, 645-53 (1997) (discussing how the increased congressional regulation of
procedure is making practice in the federal courts more complex because of the use of different
procedural rules for different types of cases, particularly those arising under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-I to
78u-4 (Supp. 11995))); Resnik, Failing Faith,supra note 113, at 531-33 (discussing how existing
rules and their interpretations by courts can harm civil rights litigants by reducing the number of
civil cases filed and tried); Tobias, supra note 123, at 832-33 (suggesting that local courts could
structure procedure unfairly to disadvantage certain counsel and litigants and such changes are likely
to affect litigants with the least financial and political power).
Mullenix notes the politically charged atmosphere that hovers over the Civil Justice Reform
Act:
mhe disguised political agenda is to remove disagreeable cases and disagreeable litigants from the federal courts. The blatant agenda is to allow local groups to create innovative procedural rules to enhance litigation efficiency; the disguised agenda is to foster
certain kinds of procedural rules that will favor certain types of litigants. The blatant
agenda is to "democratically" give procedural rulemaking authority to users of the system; the disguised agenda is to strip
the judicial branch of its traditional rulemaking
functions and transfer that function to unelected elite advisory groups dominated by business interests and corporate and insurance civil defense attorneys.
Mullenix, Counter-Reformation,supra note 56, at 439. Edwards highlights the political issues surrounding rationing plans:
[Riationing plans, like attempts to expand supply by creating new specialized courts,
must be designed to avoid conveying the impression that they are intended to limit disfavored rights or to divert the business of the poor and powerless from the federal courts
[sic) in order to preserve a convenient forum for the wealthy and powerful.
Edwards, supranote 1,at 923.
262. See generallyJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ad. 1993) (examining
the tools available to attorneys who bring or defend civil suits including how they should frame their
cases in order to properly bring them before a particular court and how the case proceeds from its
inception to a final enforceable judgment).
263.

See generally THOMAS A. MAuEr,TRIAL TECHNQUES at xix (4th ed. Aspen Law & Bus.

1996) (1980) (stating the effectiveness of a trial lawyer isbased on the attorney's development of an
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briefs and arguments forcefully present the perspective of the adversaries
and can lay the grounds for other cases and other arguments. Because the
character of participation emphasizes attempts to influence judicial officials directly through a variety of formal means, social scientists recognize litigation as a form of lobbying, analogous to the attempts to influence legislative and executive bodies.2 '
Finally, the Rules of Civil Procedure set the rules for the resolution
of conflicts between participants.' Commentators recognize that these
rules generally assume a formal equality between participants with the
anticipated result that groups representing lower social and economic
interests are disadvantaged.2' Still, in the context of the Democratic Process Ideal, the adversary process seems a highly developed institution for
public participation in the judicial process.
The Civil Justice Reform Act adopts the language of participation.
In what is described as "bottoms up" decision making, the Act directs the
formation of local advisory groups composed of those affected by the
procedures of federal trial courts. ' The affected interests are given a
direct role in advising the courts in the development of rules to implement the goals of the Act.' Therefore, the Act involves the participation
of local interests in the development of procedural rules. This involvement is substantially at odds with the uniform and national character of
existing rulemaking procedures. Linda Mullenix attacks these participation requirements, stating that they are the imposition of congressional
judgment on the courts and act to further the goals of specific interest
groups, particularly defense counsel representing the insurance industry
and the corporate bar. Although she believes that the Act reflects ceneffective method for analyzing and preparing cases for trial and the attorney's technical ability to
present their side persuasively at trial).
264.

See RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA (1997) (discussing

judicial lobbying).
265. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. (articulating the rules for commencement of actions, pleadings and motions, parties, discovery, trials, judgments and remedies).
266. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 95-97 (1974) (suggesting redistributive reformation in the
legal system to facilitate equalizing change).
267. 28 U.S.C. § 478 (1994). Because the decisions of planning groups are only suggestions,
their participation may be illusory. Indeed, courts could use the process to validate a pre-existing
judicial agenda.
268. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471,472 (articulating the particulars of developing and implementing a civil
justice expense and delay reduction plan for the federal district courts in conjunction with the implementation of advisory groups).
269. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation,supra note 56, at 406-07 (arguing that in the Brookings-Biden task force "business, corporate, and insurance industry litigators were heavily represented in comparison to other constituencies with interests in the federal courts'); id. at 438 ("Congress's central preoccupation with protecting the special interests of business and insurance concerns
supplied the bill's rationale that litigation costs impair the ability of American corporations to compete at home and abroad."); Mullenix, Separationof Powers,supra note 56, at 1287 (stating that the
Civil Justice Reform Act will "irretrievably politicize federal procedural rulemaking); see also
Lauren K. Robel, GrassRoots Procedure: LocalAdvisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act
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tralized rather than participatory decision making, her fears of interest
group dominance of the process reconfirms the participatory aspects of
the Act; for, from this dominance follows the advantage that some
groups have over others.
Some literature suggests an advantage of alternative dispute resolution is its ability to increase the participation of the parties."' In ADR, the
parties are encouraged to interact early and often in the course of the
process. Such participation permits the parties to appreciate how their
efforts have contributed to the outcome or how they "own" the process
and its results.m Alternative dispute resolution also rests on the core of
the Democratic Process Ideal in another way. That core embodiment sees
governmental decision making as a political process where values are
selected through a bargaining process among affected private actors and
government officials that leads to some legally sanctioned result, a process potentially satisfied by many forms of alternative dispute resolution.
Many forms of ADR could be seen in this same way. In fact, judgecontrolled settlements could also be viewed as a bargaining process involving the affected parties and a government official leading to an outcome to be given legal effect.
The participation, however, conceived in the Democratic Process
Ideal, focuses on participation in a forum that allows the presentation of
views to government officials responsible for decisions that affect the
interests of the persons or groups participating; it assumes openness and
broad public participation. It becomes difficult to define involvement in
private decision making as the participation conceived in the ideal.
Alternative dispute resolution also fails to fit within the Democratic
Process Ideal's conception of participation because ADR ignores values
of participation that exist independent of outcome. Feminist literature
stresses the importance of narrative and storytelling in order to legitimate
group values, to validate perspectives, and to recognize the dignitary
interests of individuals. m For example, the right of battered women to

of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 893-96 (1993) (noting that although women and minority attorneys are underrepresented in the advisory groups to federal courts, the groups seem balanced between plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys).
270. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation,supra note 56, at 407 (stating that "the Civil Justice
Reform Act amounts to a superficial layer of local pluralism that disguises what is essentially congressionally-dictated civil justice reform').
271. See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Verstehen and Dispute Resolution, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1317, 1317-19 (1992) (discussing Max Weber's concept of "understanding" (Verstehen) in
light of increased interest and participation in ADR).
272. Cf. Resnik, Rereading the FederalCourts, supranote 29, at 1052 (discussing the possibility that the federal court system is increasingly at risk as individuals with resources opt out of the
federal system to "buy their own set of private judges").
273. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. U. 2475, 2477 (1993) (noting in the
context of reconstructing legal ethics how a function of the legal system is to sort through stories in
an "orderly, nonviolent, [and] civilized manner"); Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial
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tell their stories in a public forum before officials representing the power

and authority of a democratic community vindicates these other values of
participation.' In particular, the gender bias studies of certain courts
demonstrate that these values of participation are most important to
groups which are least likely to be able to participate in the judicial process because of their lack of political or economic power or because of
discrimination or bias. "
The antimajoritarian perspective of the Rule of Law Ideal and the
Public Purposes Ideal would be expected to create some dramatic conflicts with the institutions of participation. The Public Purposes Ideal in
particular would challenge existing forms of participation; for it sees the
insulation of judges from interest group politics as fundamental' The
literature suggests that these challenges are now critical to a discussion
of the future of the federal courts.'

Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 559-73 (1991) (discussing trial procedure in the context of the significance given to different interpretations of stories); Philip N. Meyer,
Will You Please He Quiet, Please?Lawyers Listening to the Call of Stories, 18 VT. L. REv. 567,
567-68 (1994) (describing legal culture as one of storytelling); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just The Facts,
Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits,and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
123, 127 (1992) (describing how reluctance to accept the revised or delayed stories of women regarding sexual harassment or abuse particularly disadvantages them as the legal system does not
recognize these stories as "singular, immediately apparent, and permanent" as the truth or reality).
See generally Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S.CAL L. REV. 255 (1994) (examining the
growing trend of storytelling in legal scholarship). A "storytelling" rationale can also support alternative dispute resolution. In ADR, participants are entitled to tell their stories in their own ways,
unhindered by the rules of evidence. Therefore, one of the benefits of ADR is the sense that participants are able to speak in their own voices.
274. Cf. Baron, supra note 273, at 282 ("The point of these stories... is to demonstrate the gap
between the reality of the described experiences, on one side, and existing legal doctrine, on the
other.'); Florida Sup. Ct. Gender Bias Study Comm'n, Report of the FloridaSupreme Court Gender
Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L REV. at i, xxxii (1990) [hereinafter Florida Gender Bias Study]
(underscoring the importance of victim participation in litigation).
275. Cf.Baron, supra note 273, at 266-67 (storytelling in legal scholarship is particularly
important for "outsiders" or "those who lack power or who represent those who do" because storytelling becomes a critique of power). See generally MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON GENDER
BIAS INTHE COURTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS INTHE COURTS
(1989); George Lange, 1Il, Second Circuit:Study of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 32 U. RICH. L.
REv. 703, 703 n.l (1998) (discussing the development of circuit gender bias studies based on the
1992 resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States); Hon. Dolores K. Sloviter, Third
Circuit: Gender,Race, and Ethnicity--TaskForce on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 32 U. RICH. L
REv. 707 (1998) (discussing the judicial councils' studies of gender bias in their circuits); Ricki
Lewis Tamen, Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L
REv. 803 (1990) (stating that gender bias affects many areas of Florida court system and affects the
availability of the courts).
276. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 413-14 (arguing that
it is"irrational to seek to rely primarily upon courts in policing agencies' exercise of their peculiar
expertise").
277. Cf. Florida Gender Bias Study, supra note 274, at xv-xlvi (describing how judicial attitudes can affect the outcome of court proceedings).
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In recent years, the civil jury has increasingly come under attack.'
Few convincing efficiency arguments seem to support civil juries. Jury
trials are more costly and time consuming and a similarity of jury decisions and those of judges indicates that the additional costs may not be
worth the benefits.' Moreover, deviations between the decisions of juries and judges, particularly regarding damages, can be cast as evidence
of the improper bias of juries as decision makers." Supporters of civil
juries recommend a number of proposals to improve the fact finding and
decision-making ability of juries 2 5 Still, constitutional provisions for
jury trials are often analyzed as impediments to the establishment of
more efficient dispute resolution procedures, particularly ADR.m
Moreover, managerial judging makes jury trials less important. Because managerial judging occurs principally at the pretrial stage, it is
judge centered.' To the extent that managerial judging seeks to resolve
disputes without trial, its success depends upon avoiding trials, particularly jury trials.
Likewise, managerial judging increasingly casts doubt on the viability of the adversary process. Judges increasingly control the course of
the litigation, the extent of fact finding, and the likelihood of disposition

278. See, e.g., Gross & Syvenid, supra note 161, at 3 (noting that a system geared to settlement
avoids the jury); Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation
Models of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1920-24 (1993) (expressing concern
about the role of jury in hindering ADR and suggesting a balancing test for the right to trial by jury);
Rowe, supra note 8, at 854-55 (describing how the presence of the jury has a more pervasive and
widespread impact on trial procedure, preparation, and costs than is sometimes perceived).
279. But see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity ofthe CivilJury,50 VA. L. REV. 1055,1072 (1964)
(defending jury decisions as similar to those reached by judges and stating that "debate about the
merits of the jury system should center far more on the value and propriety of the jury's sense of
equity, of its modest war with the law, than on its sheer competence").
280. See James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standardsand Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751,
754-56 (1985) (suggesting that the type of defendant influences the amount a jury awards). But see
Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice:Are Malpracticeand OtherPersonalInjuries Created
Equal?,54 LAW & CoNTEmp. PoBs. 5, 6 (1991) (summarizing literature and concluding no acrossthe-board jury bias or antipathy to doctors existed in the malpractice awards studied).
281. See Weis, supra note 176, at 1391 (noting many limitations on juries are no longer justified and suggesting, for example, that jurors be permitted to submit questions and that restrictive
rules of evidence be reconsidered); see also supranote 52 and accompanying text.
282. See Magistrate Judge J. Daniel Breen, Mediation and the Magistrate Judge, 26 U. MEM.
L. REV. 100Y7, 1018 (1996) (discussing how "trial disincentive[s]" under the Civil Justice Reform
Act discourage requests for trials de novo following arbitration awards; for example, if the party
requesting trial did not obtain results at trial more favorable than arbitration, the cost of arbitration
would be assessed against the party; and noticing that in some state courts a party must pay costs of
arbitration in order to obtain trial); Eisele, supra note 214, at 1951-52 (discussing and rejecting the
position of advocates of mandatory alternative dispute resolution that greater disincentives to requesting a trial after arbitration be imposed).
283. Cf. Gross & Syvemd, supra note 161, at 2 ("We prefer settlements and have designed a
system of civil justice that embodies and expresses that preference in everything from the rules of
procedure and evidence, to appellate opinions, to legal scholarship, to the daily work of our trial
judges.").

1998]

A WAY OF TALKING ABOUT BUREAUCRACY

before trial. The cumulative effect of reforms, including those regarding
discovery and those advocated by the Civil Justice Reform Act, questions the appropriateness of extensive adversarial involvement. John
Langbein, for example, has argued that managerial judging has already
moved our procedure much closer to the continental inquisitorial
model-a model that conceives a much more limited role for attorneys.'
As importantly, managerial judging is deeply embedded in the normative
assumptions of the Public Purposes Ideal. These normative assumptions,
stressing judicial expertise, professional discretion, and political neutrality, clash directly with those that conceive of the adversarial process as
an important institution for popular participation in the judicial process.
The language of bureaucracy helps to identify this clash of normative
assumptions.
2.

Oversight

When the efficacy of participation is in doubt, Sargentich would
suggest consideration of political oversight by democratically accountable institutions.' The Constitution creates methods of oversight both by
Congress and the President.' The President appoints federal judges with
the advice and consent of the Senate. ' The appointment power is an
important presidential prerogative, and the requirement for consent by
the Senate is likewise important for the legislature. The appointment
power seems the constitutional mechanism by which, over a period of
time, the attitudes and political perspectives of federal judges can be altered. The last two decades have witnessed a number of bitter conflicts
between presidents and the Senate regarding the appointment of justices
to the United States Supreme Court.' Although lower federal court appointments are overwhelmingly partisan, with the President often appointing members of his own party, ' conflicts have rarely become public. Procedures in the Senate, however, have begun to delay the appoint-

284. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 833-35 (emphasizing that continental inquisitorial procedure preserves party interest by limiting adversarial influence in fact finding, but the adversarial role
is preserved in the attorney's positions on the evidence); see also Kipp & Lewis, supra note 8, at 309
(contrasting traditional American view of judicial involvement to "the activist model... pervasive
in continental Europe"); cf. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 82-84 (anticipating an increasing
managerial role for the federal judge).
285. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supranote 12, at 431-32.
286. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I,§2,cl. 5;art. l,§3,cl. 6;art. I,§2,cl.2;art.LIU,§ l;art.,§2,
cl. 2 (setting the constitutional oversights of the judiciary by Congress and the President).
287. See id. art. II, § 2, cL 2.
288. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO
REWRITE THE CONsTrTnON 48 (1988) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS] (describing
controversial appointments prior to 1980); id. at 103-49 (discussing more recent appointments).
289. See WHEELEmt & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 6 ("Consistently, over 90% of any President's
judicial appointments have been of his own political party...."); see also Clark, supra note 1, at
137 (describing Nixon's appointment of primarily Republican judges).
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ment of new federal judges and have been accompanied by attacks on
"activist judges." The Constitution not only gives Congress, through the Senate, an
important role in the appointment of judges, but also provides for impeachment of judges by Congress."' In addition, Congress has extremely
broad, but not unlimited, authority to modify the jurisdiction of the fedm ' Within the Constieral courts' and to alter the structure of the courts
tution, Congress also enjoys considerable discretion in the appropriation
of moneys for the judiciary."
A number of recent developments regarding federal procedure and
substantive reform indicate that congressional oversight of the judiciary
has become more extensive. Perhaps best known is the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, ' which some commentators see as congressional intervention in the preeminence of the courts' procedural rulemaking."
The Act embodies a congressional view of procedural reform and imposes mandates to ensure that the judiciary follows that view. The significance of this recent congressional action is demonstrated by renewed
interest in both the scope of the Rules Enabling Act' and constitutional
limits on the power of Congress in this field.'

290. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2. In his report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist expressed concern about the Senate's delay in filling judicial vacancies: "The
Senate is surely under no obligation to confirm any particular nominee, but after the necessary time
for inquiry it should vote him up or vote him down. In the latter case, the President can then send up
another nominee." William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary
(visited Dec. 12, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm>.
291. U.S. CONsr. akt. I, § 3, cl. 6.
292. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned [and not
subject to original jurisdiction], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."); cf Wilfred Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch:" The Tradition of Attacks on Judicial
Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 252, 252-54 (1984) (discussing attempts by Congress to make changes in
the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in response to decisions that they did not agree with).
293. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United State's, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
294. See, e.g., Longan, supra note 261, at 629-34; Tacha, supranote 55, at 1542-44.
295. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
296. Cf. Baker, FutureofJudicialFederalism,supra note 32, at 779-82 (stating that the Civil
Justice Reform Act decentralized, destabilized, and politicized rulemaking and that more congressional intervention is likely); Mullenix, Counter-Reformation,supra note 56, at 379 ("The central
importance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is this: the Act has effected a revolutionary redistribution
of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal judicial branch to the legislative branch.");
Mullenix, Separationof Powers, supra note 56, at 1288, 1314-22 (concluding that the Civil Justice
Reform Act violates the separation of powers).
297. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415,48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074(1994)).
298. See, e.g., Longan, supra note 261, at 640-42; McCabe, supra note 123, at 1684-86; see
also supranote 296.
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Other commentators have expressed concern that modified impeachment procedures, motivated in good part by congressional convenience, threaten to erase the constitutional limits on the exercise of this
power.' These procedures expedite the impeachment process by limiting
"trial" of impeachment charges to committees or groups within the Senate. To some, these changes, by making impeachment proceedings less
burdensome on Congress, may encourage its expanded use."'
Congress has also acted to reduce the discretion of federal judges in
important areas. One of these areas involves criminal, rather than civil,
justice reform, but nevertheless marks the direction that Congress has
taken with the courts. Perhaps best known are the Sentencing
Guidelines,' which were opposed by many federal judges as undue and
unwise interference with judicial discretion.' Although a Sentencing
Commission rather than Congress establishes the guidelines, the guidelines implement a congressional judgment to limit judicial discretion.
Tort reform proposals, although not principally directed at federal
courts, represent another manifestation of a congressional taste for
greater oversight over the courts. These proposals alter state tort law, an
area traditionally within the common law domain of the courts.' Some
critics suggest that Congress will become a court of appeals with nationwide jurisdiction over state courts, removing industry after industry from
substantive regulation by state common law.' Such an approach, which
brings interest group conflict directly to bear on the exercise of judicial

299. See Williams, supra note 57, at 856 (criticizing the Senate's use of shortcut procedures for
impeachment); Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2 (describing threats of impeachment for content of
opinions). See generally WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57 (discussing methods of judicial dismissal
and removal).
300. Williams, supra note 57, at 886-87.
301. Cf. id. at 886-88. The Senate Rule XI Committee only assembles facts for action by the
Senate. Cf. id. Congressional procedures are unlikely to be successfully challenged. The Supreme
Court has held that Congress may choose its impeachment procedures and that a challenge to these
procedures raises a political question which the judiciary will not adjudicate. Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224,226 (1993) (addressing Rule XI procedures).
302. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997).
303. See Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681, 1685-87 (1992). In instituting the sentencing
guidelines, Congress arguably adopted the vision of the judiciary contained in the Rule of Law Ideal.
This vision emphasizes a judiciary whose discretion is guided and controlled by legal rules. See
Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supra note 12, at 398. See generally Steve Y. Koh,
Note, Reestablishingthe FederalJudge'sRole in Sentencing, 101 YALE LJ. 1109 (1992) (discussing the effects of reduced judicial discretion due to the implementation of the sentencing guidelines).
304. See U.S. SE.TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. I, pt. A.
305. See Andrew F. Popper, A Federal Tort Law Is Still a Bad Idea: A Comment on Senate Bill
687, 16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 105, 113-14 (1994) (discussing congressional attempts to federalize state tort law).
306. See d.
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power, is unlikely to be limited to the state courts. Congressional assumption of such "jurisdiction" over state courts implicates the traditional jurisdictional standards and practices developed by the federal
courts to regulate their relationship with state judiciaries. Looking at
recent legislation, commentators insinuate that Congress now treats the
judiciary less and less like an independent branch and more and more
like another government agency."
Some detect greater attention by Congress and the President to judicial selections.' If the judiciary was to become a campaign issue, partisan political considerations might increasingly be brought to bear on
appointment and confirmation of trial and appellate judges. In the appropriate political climate, the line-item veto, with some changes in the appropriation process, might give the President and factions in Congress
significant new power of fiscal oversight over the judiciary."' Given that
the President's political constituency does not necessarily reflect the
public's views on particular issues regarding the federal judiciary,
placement of such oversight authority in the President will allow the involvement of some, but not all, affected interests. Likewise, Congress,
although a collective body, suffers from a similar disability. Because of
the crucial roles that particular committees and specific members of
Congress or their staffs play, this oversight is likely to be an exercise for
the benefit of some, but not all, affected interests.
Of the three ideals, the Democratic Process Ideal fits less easily into
the current discourse regarding the future of the federal courts. In part,
this difficulty flows from the dominance of the Rule of Law and Public
Purposes Ideals---both of which insulate judges from politics. Yet existing institutions and procedures of the federal courts serve to implement
this ideal as well. The way in which Sargentich and Frug speak about
307. See Baker, Futureof JudicialFederalism,supra note 32, at 759-60 (stating that despite its
attempts to limit the impact on federal jurisdiction, national tort reform has clear implications for
congressional treatment of the federal courts).
308. Cf. Longan, supra note 261, at 668 (concluding that Congress is too involved with judicial
procedure, structure, practice, and policy). But cf Tacha, supra note 55, at 1555 (taking a more
optimistic view of the relationship, and seeing the necessity of dialogue, tolerance, and understanding to gain more effective results).
309. Schwartz, supra note 57, at M2 (indicating recent attacks on the judiciary by members of
Congress). Professor Schwartz has also recognized the greater willingness of recent presidents to
guide selections by political criteria. See SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS, supra note 288, at 4849, 77. Schwartz, however, argues that the Reagan administration relied on political ideology in a
way previously unknown. See id. at 77. Historically, judicial appointments have been
overwhelmingly partisan with Democratic presidents appointing Democrats and Republican
presidents appointing Republicans. See WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 57, at 10 ("Consistently,
over 90%of any President's judicial appointments have been of his own political party.").
310. Cf. Longan, supra note 261, at 635 (noting the fear that the line-item veto may "impair the
independence of the judiciary in cases involving the executive branch'). Constitutional scholar Louis
Fisher takes a similar view of the line-item veto arguing that oversight responsibilities over the
judiciary rest properly in Congress and not the executive because the executive branch has more
lawsuits in the federal courts than any other litigant. Fisher, supra note 55, at 53.
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bureaucracy allows a systematic consideration of a group of values often
obscured in the debate.

II. THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
If I have been successful, the first Part of this article has demonstrated that the analytical schemes of two prominent administrative law
scholars can organize and illuminate the debate regarding the future of
the federal courts. The Sargentich and Frug articles permit examination
of these proposals in ways that highlight the values at issue. In this sense,
these works, contemporaneous with one another, "' create a way of talking about bureaucracy applicable to the courts. In this Part, I seek to
show how this language about bureaucracy can be used in additional
ways to evaluate as well as to organize the debate. Such use requires a
reexamination of the Sargentich and Frug articles with greater attention
to their analytical approaches.
Sargentich and Frug write from different traditions, different perspectives that contain contrasts and conflicts. Despite these differences,
their articles contain a number of similarities that suggest approaches to
evaluating the debate. Specifically, these similarities indicate how to
assess a number of proposals as well as the arguments that can be marshaled for and against a variety of proposals. Their approaches require a
recognition that combinations of arguments contain individual arguments
that reflect specific visions of the judiciary. Evaluation requires linking
each argument to the corresponding underlying vision or model from
which it comes. According to both Sargentich and Frug, this act alone
will expose the weakness of an argument and the possible inconsistency
of arguments that have been placed together."' As discussed in Part I,
Sargentich's methodology uncovers inconsistencies in arguments that
superficially appear compatible. Some specific examples from the debate
regarding the future of the federal courts illustrate these points.
The similarities between the two analytical schemes expose the
vagueness and indeterminacy of broad terms, such as "judicial independence" and "individual rights," that populate much of the literature. The
meaning of these terms shifts with the vision of the judiciary that uses
them. Frug highlights more general objections to the use of such terms in
resolving the conflict of values."' Again, the literature of judicial reform
elucidates these observations.
The Sargentich and Frug articles offer some general rules for the
evaluation of the methods of analysis used in the debate regarding the
future of the federal courts. For example, both are suspicious of analysis

311. The articles were both published in 1984.
312. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1287-88; Sargentich, American
Adinistrative Process,supra note 12, at 394.
313. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supranote 19, at 1287.
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that relies on the balancing of values seen to be in tension with one another.!" Both recognize a paradox or contradiction at the heart of the
most certain of arguments and perceive arguments, particularly complex
combinations of arguments, as hiding rather than resolving that inconsistency."' Both accept that arguments alone cannot reconcile the conflicts that they represent."" These striking similarities in approach, despite differences in perspective, emphasize the importance of the language chosen to debate the future of the federal courts and affirm the
contributions of a language about bureaucracy to that debate.
Finally, these two articles require that evaluation look beyond the
specific arguments surrounding particular proposals to confront the implications of conflicting normative visions of the judiciary. These articles
indicate that argument must, at some point, yield to judgment; that judgment must address issues of value and politics. Such judgments will be
troubling, for this way of talking about bureaucracy suggests both the
necessity for and the difficulty of the choices required.
A. Evaluation ofArguments
Although a number of caveats should always accompany a limited
characterization of such broad works, the two articles reflect different
perspectives. Sargentich writes from a classical political and administrative theory perspective.3?" At the heart, his ideals of administrative law
reflect classical political theory regarding the role of the state and of administration. His article presents these ideals as representing broad theories in administrative and public law.IAs such, they have direct application to the reformist debate regarding administration.
Frug writes from a critical legal studies perspective, particularly that
aspect of the movement that emphasizes contradictions arising from
prevalent but unsustainable concepts, such as the distinction between the
objective and the subjective!" The presence of this dichotomy in legal

314. See id.; Sargentich, AmericanAdministrative Process,supranote 12, at 441.
315. See infranote 341 and accompanying text.
316. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
317. In his article, Sargentich identifies the ideals of administrative law with British and
American political theory. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supranote 12, at 397426. For example, the Rule of Law Ideal is associated with contractarian views of political life. See
id. at 397-98 (citing John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVEItNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960)). The Public Purposes Ideal is associated with an activist
state reflected by New Deal theorists. See id. at 411-12 (citing JAMES LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEsS (1938)). The Democratic Process Ideal "derives its intellectual force
from democratic theory." Id. at 425-26.
318. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 1288 (drawing on the work of
Jacques Derrida, particularly his idea of the "dangerous supplement" to develop the contradictions
contained in different models for the control of bureaucracy). For a general discussion of this aspect
of the critical legal studies movement, see James Boyle, Introductionto CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES at
i, xiii-xlvi (James Boyle, ed. 1992).
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theory and doctrine regarding bureaucracy drives much of Frug's critique. His models justifying bureaucracy are presented as more contingent than Sargentich's ideals. 19 His analysis of these models demonstrates that supposedly objective legal doctrines are rhetoric designed to
assuage our fear of bureaucracy, and are devices designed to retard a
democratic agenda for reducing the power of bureaucracies tm
These differences in perspective explain the contrast in the character
of the projects undertaken by the two articles' and suggest conflicts regarding the reality of structures of arguments that form the focus of the
articles. For our purposes, however, the similarities are more important
than these differences. The similarities between the two articles, particularly those evident in their conclusions and implications, offer guidelines
for evaluating arguments in the debate regarding judicial reform and the
future of the federal courts. Although both articles draw on historical
developments, neither employs historical or empirical analysis nor do
they focus on detailed examinations of specific proposals or doctrines.
Both, however, are concerned with the structure of argumentation. This
emphasis on broad structures of argumentation makes them particularly
useful in evaluating arguments in the debate about the future of the federal courts.
Each of the articles identifies a paradox or contradiction that lies at
the heart of the ideals or models that it analyzes." This contradiction or
paradox limits arguments flowing from each ideal or model. Although
Sargentich stresses that the pure vision of administration contained
within each of his ideals conflicts with the reality of the administrative
process, a reality that incorporates aspects of other inconsistent ideals,'m
he identifies a paradox within each ideal that also limits its application.'

319. For example, Fug does not assert that his models actually represent the state of legal
doctrine but rather expose the contradictions in attempts to persuade us that bureaucracy and its
potential for domination and alienation are appropriately limited. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,
supranote 19, at 1282.
320. See id. at 1278-79.
321. Sargentich seeks to show how the debate about reform of the administrative process has a
deep structure based on normative conflict that arises from conceptions about the role of government
and administration. See Sargentich, American AdministrativeProcess,supra note 12, at 396-97. The
debate is "more self-contained and limited in scope than it may initially appear." Id. This project
contrasts with Frug's exposure of these models of control as an antecedent to the construction of a
democratically-based approach to our social and economic life. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,
supra note 19, at 1277-79.
322. Frug uses the inability to separate the objective and subjective as the basis for the contradictions he identifies in each of his models. See Frog, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supra note 19, at
1286-87. His critique of the market/pluralist and judicial review models rests on his discussion of
the contradictions in the formalist and expertise models. See id.
at 1297. Sargentich, as the following
discussion illustrates, relies on aspects of each normative vision that are self-defeating and paradoxi-

cal. See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.
323. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process,supra note 12, at 394 (discussing the
character of this limitation on the core embodiment of each ideal).
324.

See id.
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As Sargentich puts it, the implementation of these ideals would require
reforms of administration that would undermine the ideal itself' 2' The
core embodiment of each ideal is therefore "self-defeating." "' Formalism's drive to subject all administrative action to restraint by norms requires norms of such indeterminacy that they no longer provide any restraint.' Instrumentalism's attempt to reach the optimal solution considering all relevant factors requires that virtually all factors be taken into
account, depriving analysis of any content and leading to indeterminacy
in outcome.' Finally, participation's desire to include all affected parties
in decision making either leads to the participation of all idiosyncratic
interests or the selection of participants by nondemocratic means."
Frug's critique rests on the necessity that the models justifying bureaucracy separate the subjective from the objective.' Each of the attempts, reflected in the models of control of the bureaucracy, finds it
impossible to draw such a line."' With respect to formalism's attempt to
set the goals of the bureaucracy by means external to it, the nondelegation doctrine demonstrates that no effective standard can separate the
need to subject the bureaucracy to external standards from its need for
discretion or can separate the legislative need for discretion in delegation
of functions from the need to restrain that discretion?' The expertise
model fails to explain how professional standards intended to restrain the
discretion necessary to the exercise of expertise can act as restraints
when interpreted by the bureaucracy which they are designed to limit!'
In pluralism, the attempt to define those interests which will participate
in the administrative process and how they will participate implicates the
bureaucracy in the selection of those who will determine the outcome of
administrative decisions and raise the familiar difficulty of attempting to
separate the subjective from the objective? '
Frug's description of the weaknesses in these three stories or models
parallels Sargentich's description of the self-defeating character of the
core embodiments of his three ideals."' These similarities suggest that
arguments regarding judicial reform should be linked to the ideal or
model which they represent. Such a linkage identifies the theoretical

325.

See id.

326.
327.
328.

Id.
See id. at 403-04.
See id. at 415-16.

329. See id. at 428-30.
330.

See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supra note 19, at 1287.

331.

See id.

332.
333.

See i. at 1300-05.
See id. at 1321-22.

334. See id. at 1368-69.
335. Fnhg's fourth model, the judicial review model, permits him to demonstrate that the mixing of models, formalism, and expertise does not avoid the contradictions contained in each of those

models. See id. at 1334-38.
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vision of the courts contained within it. That argument will be limited by
or "infected with" " the paradox or contradiction contained within that
vision. Although Sargentich and Frug would give slightly different criteria for identifying the contradiction in the argument, the argument's
pedigree permits evaluation of it apart from the particular proposal that it
supports or opposes.
In the debate regarding the future of the federal courts, a number of
arguments will be presented in support or opposition of particular proposals. These sets of arguments will combine arguments from different
ideals and from different models. Frug's discussion of the judicial review
model explores how arguments using both the formalist and expertise
models can be combined, but explains how once recognized, critique of
them within those specific models can be combined to deal as well with
the mixing of them.' Sargentich's analysis permits a similar approach
but emphasizes that arguments arising from different ideals will necessarily conflict with one another because they reflect different visions of
the administrative process.""
Sargentich's recognition of a core embodiment and alternative expression of each ideal allows a more searching evaluation of multiple
arguments presented regarding a particular proposal. Although the core
embodiments of the three ideals cannot be easily combined without their
inconsistency becoming apparent, the alternative expression of one ideal
may be combined with the core embodiment of another without apparent
inconsistency. Still, a recognition of the vision reflected by the alternative expression allows identification of the inconsistency between arguments placed together. '
The literature regarding the future of the federal courts illustrates a
number of these guidelines regarding the evaluation of arguments. Alternative dispute resolution provides one example. The previous discussion
of ADR introduced many of the arguments regarding the use of ADR in

336. Id. at 1330.
337. See id. at 1334-38.
338. See Sargentich, American Administrative Process, supranote 12, at 392-97.
339. Sargentich notes an overlap between the formalist core embodiment and the market, the
alternative expression of the Public Purposes Ideal. The core embodiment of the Public Purposes
Ideal, instrumentalism, also overlaps with political oversight, the alternative expression of the
Democratic Process Ideal. The core embodiment of the Democratic Process Ideal, participation, also
is linked to proceduralism, the alternative expression of the Rule of Law Ideal. See id. at 440-41.
"[Bloth approaches emphasize innovation in decisional processes, the language of fairness, and the
interests of affected parties in becoming involved in administration." id. at 440.
340. For example, the relationship between formalism and the market fails to appreciate that
they reflect different visions of the administrative process. The market approach permits, in the name
of market failure, administrative action far beyond the scope of the confining legal norms accepted
by formalism. Instrumentalism places a faith in agency expertise and the importance of "rational
decision making" that is at odds with the vision of public participation that supports political oversight. Participation accepts politics in the administrative process that would be anathematic to the
focus on legal roles that supports proceduralism.
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federal courts& That discussion also shows that a number of supporting
arguments arise from the Public Purposes Ideal. ADR proposals, however, oscillate between the core of instrumentalism and the alternative
expression of the market. Although tensions exist between these conceptions of ADR, both draw on a similar vision of the judiciary.
The fundamental incompatibility of the core embodiments of opposing ideals suggests that arguments representing the core of these visions could not be combined. Arguments resting on the core embodiment
of participation do not support alternative dispute resolution without redefining the term "participation" in ways that remove the definition from
the core vision that it represents, including its emphasis on transparency
& ' To the extent that participation
of process.
can be invoked to justify
political bargaining among affected parties and government officials, it is
at conflict with the Rule of Law's emphasis on legal formalism as the
legitimate method of official decision making. Likewise, arguments relying on formalism cannot be combined with those arising from instrumentalism. For example, mandatory ADR, reflecting instrumentalism,
rests on judicial activism and discretion' contradicting the limited judicial role conceived by formalism.
Sargentich, however, suggests that an unstable alliance can be
forged between the alternative expression of the market and the core
embodiment of formalism:" "[B]oth adhere to the notions that the public
and private spheres must be kept separate, that legal norms help provide
the necessary boundaries between the two realms, and more particularly
that public laws should preserve private entitlements from undue impositions by the state." '" Arguments regarding alternative dispute resolution do combine the types of arguments contained in this alliance. Arguments supporting voluntary ADR not only emphasize placing dispute
resolution in the hands of private parties" but also seek to limit heavyhanded judicial interference with private arrangements." However, the
alternative expression of the Public Purposes Ideal retains a part of that
vision of the judiciary. That vision emerges in the variety of arguments
that justify judicial involvement in these private arrangements, justifications analogous to ones supporting administrative intervention in the
market.' Formalism, on the other hand, would not permit judicial involvement based on such broad and unbounded grounds. These argu341.
342.
343.
344.

See supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
See Sargentich, American Adminstrative Process,supranote 12, at 440--41.

345.

Id. at 440.

346. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. This view is particularly apparent in the debate regarding arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See supra notes 2 12-13 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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ments for judicial intervention expose the inconsistent visions of the judiciary that undermine this alliance.
A similar unstable alliance can exist between instrumentalism and
political oversight. "[Tihey both stress the multiplicity of goals and interests that must be balanced in the context of administrative decision
making."' Part of the recent expansion of ADR follows the congressional mandate that ADR be included in the delay reduction plans of
local federal district courts.' Of course, the arguments supporting this
action emphasize political oversight and congressional prerogative but
they also stress that Congress rather than the judiciary is the most competent to make the broad balancing of costs and benefits necessary to
ensure that judicial procedure is more rational and efficient."' Congressional oversight, however, shares the emphasis of the Democratic Process Ideal on popular participation in establishing judicial policy, a view
at odds with instrumentalism's emphasis on judicial expertise and discretion.
This example, regarding ADR, demonstrates that this way of talking
about bureaucracy can help to evaluate, as well as to organize, arguments
and proposals by linking arguments to the vision of the judiciary upon
which they rely and by identifying inconsistent arguments that are placed
together. This method of evaluation can also be applied to other sets of
arguments and proposals. 2
B. Evaluationof Analysis
Both of the articles offer some similar guidelines for evaluation of
the forms of argumentation and analysis that occur frequently in the debate regarding the future of the federal courts. The first of these guidelines questions the usefulness of broad concepts that often frequent the
debate about bureaucracy. Frug expressly attacks the use of abstractions
on the ground that appeals to abstractions seek to use them to deduce a
particular form of bureaucratic organization. ' "Instead, contradictory
forms of life can be consistent with the same abstract goal."' Abstractions are easy to manipulate and can hide alternatives and make particular forms of organizations seem natural.'
Sargentich's critique of abstractions is indirect but can be implied
from his analysis. His implied critique is quite similar to Frug's express
one. Abstractions, such as participation, openness or discretion, have
349. Sargentich, American AdministrativeProcess,supra note 12, at 440.
350. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
352. For example, the debate about the size of the federal judiciary permits a similar analysis.
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
353. See Frug, Ideology of Bureaucracy,supranote 19, at 1293.
354. Id.
355. See id. at 1294-95.
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multiple meanings; the key to understanding them is recognition of the
ideal or vision that they are used to support. The uneasy alliance between
the core embodiments of some ideals with the alternative expressions of
others rests in part on the ability to manipulate abstractions.'

The debate regarding the future of the federal courts contains two
abstractions that populate much of the debate-judicial independence
and individual rights. The critique of abstractions would suggest these
abstractions can support more than one vision of the judiciary and can be
used to make inconsistent visions seem the natural result of the abstract
goals suggested by the terms, judicial independence and individual
rights. The literature of judicial reform supports this suggestion. Judicial
independence is an abstraction repeatedly appealed to as a basic value of
the judiciary." The impact of proposals or practices on judicial independence often forms the basis for support or opposition to the proposals.
Conceptions of judicial independence, however, vary and can support
differing visions of the judiciary.'
The Long Range Planfor the Federal Courts (Long Range Plan)

illustrates the elusive character of the abstraction, judicial
independence. ' The Long Range Plan identifies judicial independence
as a core value of the federal judiciary. Judicial independence is defined
in terms of the ability of federal judges "to perform their duties in an
atmosphere free from fear that an unpopular decision will threaten their
livelihood or existence," ' and links independence to tenure in office."'
The Long Range Plan uses judicial independence as an abstraction, a
broad concept that is used to deduce a particular form of judicial tenure.
The multiple meanings of judicial independence are both exposed
and explained by examining the term in the context of each of the visions
356. See Sargentich, American Adinistrative Process,supra note 12, at 440-41 (describing
how arguments obscure their normative inconsistency). His description of the overlap shows that the
inconsistency in arguments placed together in part is obscured by the use of abstractions, such as
protection of the private sphere, openness, presidential competency, and responsiveness. See id.
357. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 8 (identifying
judicial independence as a core value of the federal judiciary); RICHARDSON & VINES, supranote 2,
at 175 ('Certainly judicial independence in America does not mean an objective, nor detached,
judiciary. Rather, it broadens the range of possible political responses that a judge may make.");
Dakolias, supra note 209, at 175 (stating that "[pjersonal independence for judges can be achieved
through appropriate methods of appointment, removal and supervision"); Fiss, Forms of Justice,
supra note 151, at 43-44 (discussing judicial independence in terms of the ability to protect individual rights and civil liberties); Langbein, supra note 1,at 848-55 (equating judicial independence
with bureaucratic organization and hierarchical control of judges); cf.Resnik, FailingFaith, supra
note 113, at 540 (stating that, among other things, "minimal judicial decisionmaking will [hopefully)
produce just results").
358. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 8. The statement of this
core value specifically refers to life tenure and protection against decreases in salary. See id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See id.
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of the judiciary. The concept of judging changes with alterations in the
character of the judicial role. A brief examination of the core embodiments, formalism, instrumentalism and participation, exposes the chameleon nature of the term. Formalism conceives a limited role for the
judge, a limited role that renders vulnerable an unelected judiciary.
Therefore, this aspect of formalism could be used to argue for more limited tenure for judges. ' On the other hand, the obligation of judges to
apply formal rules to limit state interference in the private sphere supports arguments for greater protection of the tenure of judges. In other
words, formalism could support arrangements regarding tenure similar to
those now existing or it could support ones less protective of individual
judges.
Instrumentalism conceives a more active role for the judge, arguably one calling for greater protection. This need for greater protection
from outside interference supports rigorous protection of judicial tenure.
The more expansive role for the judge, however, suggests the need for
methods of accountability that could radically transform the role of individual judges by making them accountable to a hierarchical judicial bureaucracy.' The conception of the judiciary as a powerful independent
bureaucracy challenges the authority and discretion of individual
judges.'
Participation conceives of a more democratically accountable judiciary. This conception is the one most likely to resist life tenure for
judges, an approach that can be most easily justified under instrumentalism. To the extent, however, that the core embodiment of participation
emphasizes decision making by juries and control of the trial process by
the parties, it could coexist with an unelected judiciary. The more the
judge is removed from direct involvement as an actor in the process and
instead serves principally as an umpire, the less important the democratic
accountability of the judge.
In describing how the visions of the judiciary can support differing
views, the discussion above adopted the focus of The Long Range Plan
on judicial tenure as the principal indicator of judicial independence.' A
variety of other topics, however, could be considered crucial to judicial

362. If the formalist critique focuses on the political isolation of judges, one response is to alter
the tenure of judges; however, as distinguished below, this response would be inconsistent with the
formalist focus on the application by judges of legal rules that limit state interference with private
liberty. See infra notes 366-68 and accompanying text. In this regard, formalism can be of two
minds regarding judicial tenure and more ambiguously supports life tenure than instrumentalism.
363. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
364. Judges continue to exercise considerable discretion but would themselves become subject
to bureaucratic control.
365. 'The Long Range Plan, when referring to judicial independence, also states that "[tihc
federal court system must continue to be in control of its own governance, albeit within the limitations set by the Constitution's system of checks and balances." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 162, at 8.
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independence including selection of judges, discipline, training, funding,
and relationships to other centers of political power. Examination of judiciaries in Latin America questions whether a judiciary is independent if
it retains authority of many routine matters but cedes the punishment of
political dissenters to other branches.' Each of these other topics could
be analyzed similarly from the perspective of each of the visions of the
judiciary. Indeed, the ranking of these various topics in importance
would vary depending upon each such vision.' Judicial independence is
an abstraction that obscures a variety of issues and that can be used to
support inconsistent approaches to judicial reform.
Similar observations can be made regarding the use of the- abstraction, contrasting individual rights.' For example, that term carries substantially different meanings in formalism, instrumentalism, and participation. In formalism, the courts protect individual rights by adhering to
rules that establish the boundary between the state and the private sphere;
in instrumentalism, the courts protect individual rights by ensuring that
the individual is protected from abuse by both state and private bureaucracies. What formalism could perceive as the protection of individual
rights by limiting state interference in private affairs, instrumentalism
could see as the abandonment of the individual and the failure of the
courts to ensure the implementation of public values. Participation challenges formalism because in formalism the rules applied are not generated by direct democratic participation. The tension between the independence of the jury as decision maker and the preservation of judicial
integrity in the service of the rule of law demonstrates this conflict.
Likewise, decisions resting on participation implicate a political process
that may exclude important public values in ways that are inconsistent
with instrumentalism.
Both articles suggest another guideline for the evaluation of argumentation and analysis. Both articles are suspicious of analysis that relies
on the balancing of values seen to be in tension with one another. Frug
presents a strong general critique of balancing as a method of analysis or
argumentation.' In his specific discussion of the judicial review model,
he views balancing as a judicial technique that restates the problem to be
solved.' This critique of judicial balancing in the context of judicial

366. See Vaughn, JudicialReform, supranote 94, at 601-07.
367. For example, instumentalism places great weight on the insulation of the judge. This
emphasis suggests that tenure in office and appointment procedures are likely to be of most importance. Formalism might place greater weight on rules and procedure that limit the boundaries of
judicial power.
368. Fiss captures the distinction between the conceptions of individual rights contained in
formalism and instumentalism when e decries an individualism that leaves the individual "at the
mercy of large aggregations of power." Fiss, Forms ofJustice,supra note 15 1, at 43.
369. See Frug,Ideology of Bureaucracy,supranote 19, at 1291-95.
370. See id. at 1341-43.
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review is also more generally applicable to balancing as a method of
argumentation and analysis.
Sargentich's objections to balancing naturally follow from the
themes of his article. Again, these objections are quite similar to Frug's.
Balancing the values contained in the different ideals of administrative
law cannot resolve the conflicts between them because these values represent contradictory views of the administrative process." Balancing
simply restates the conflict and claims a certainty of outcome that belies
the normative inconsistency of the ideals. Within each of the ideals, Sargentich's analysis suggests skepticism of balancing. For example, his
discussion of the problem of administrative discretion in the Rule of Law
Ideal would deny that the difficulty can be resolved by balancing in each
case the need for discretion against the requirement that administrative
action follow articulated legal norms.'
This guideline would caution that balancing is unlikely to resolve
the conflicts that arise from inconsistent visions of the judiciary. An examination of the literature supports such caution. Balancing does seem to
restate rather than resolve fundamental inconsistencies between differing
visions of the judiciary. The limitations of balancing become more apparent when abstractions are balanced against one another because the
abstractions balanced can each carry a variety of meanings.!'
Of course, the two articles represent, in one sense only, a subset of
more general objections to balancing as a technique of analysis. A similar statement can also be made regarding the other guidelines as well.
The extraction of these guidelines from these two articles, however, is
particularly important and suggests an applicability beyond that provided
by more general methodological critiques. This article seeks to develop a
way of talking about bureaucracy from these two comprehensive analyses of administrative bureaucracies. In this undertaking it is significant
that the guidelines arise organically from the analysis of Frug's and Sargentich's theories about such bureaucracies. The context of their development validates the subsequent application of these guidelines. Also,
the particular applicability of this way of talking about bureaucracy to
the debate regarding the future of the federal courts, discussed in Part I,
specifically recommends these guidelines to an evaluation of that debate.
CONCLUSION

The way in which the Sargentich and Frug articles talk about bureaucracy permits the organization of the debate about the future of the
federal courts. This language about bureaucracy places the welter of pro371. See Sargentich, American AdministrativeProcess, supra note 12, at 438-42.
372. See id. at 402-04.
373. Such balancing of abstractions include efficiency balanced against individual rights (or
efficiency balanced against justice), judicial independence balanced against judicial accountability,
or national standans balanced against local autonomy.
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posals within a normative framework that demonstrates that the debate is
more structured and self-contained than the number of proposals and accompanying arguments might suggest. As importantly, this language clarifies the perspectives that guide the debate and highlights a perspective, the
Democratic Process Ideal, that otherwise could be obscured.
The way in which the Sargentich and Frug articles talk about bureaucracy also permits evaluation of the debate. Particularly, it allows the
evaluation of specific arguments and proposals as well as combination of
sets of arguments. It also questions some approaches to analysis that populate the debate. The language about bureaucracy suggested by the Sargentich and Frug articles does not purport to resolve the debate regarding the
future of the federal courts. This way of talking about bureaucracy does not
recommend the choice of one proposal over another. Like any systematic
way of talking about a subject, these articles offer a useful perspective and
permit the debate to be structured in some new and enlightening ways.
The conclusions drawn from these articles provide no solace from uncertainty and present no plan for the future of the federal courts. Indeed,
the language suggested by these analytical models of bureaucracy threatens the grounds upon which some of the debate has been conducted. It
does so in several ways. No set of arguments can resolve the debate. This
failure results not simply from the lack of persuasive power of the arguments but also from the limits of the arguments themselves. These arguments and proposals reflect inconsistent alternatives. Not all visions can
guide the future. In addition, the visions represented by the arguments and
proposals contain contradictions that make it impossible to adopt fully any
particular vision. The lack of consensus about the future of the federal
courts results from conflicts between normative visions that inhere in modem American public law. These conflicts will not disappear.
The application of these articles to the debate about civil justice reform
does not resolve that debate. The articles, however, do identify suppressed
normative visions, explain inconsistencies in argumentation as clashes between these normative visions, and demonstrate that civil justice reform is
inextricably intertwined with the most fundamental value conflicts in
American public law.
These articles demonstrate the highly contingent nature of the debate.
They deny resolution and certainty. They do, however, permit a clearer
appreciation of the conflict of visions and values. In this sense, the way of
talking about bureaucracy contained in the Sargentich and Frug articles is
encouraging. It permits us to see better the conflicts between values and
perspectives that will inform our decisions. It emphasizes the possible futures of the federal courts. It affirms that the choices are ours, painfully ours.

